--------------- FIDO MESSAGE AREA==> TOPIC: 233 NFB BLIND NEWS Ref: EBY00015Date: 07/28/97 From: JULIE DAWSON Time: 11:00am \/To: ALL (Read 0 times) Subj: 14:Equality of Opportunity -- HISTORY.TX11:00:3307/28/97 From: Julie Dawson Subject: Equality of Opportunity -- HISTORY.TXT (fwd) independence, and opportunity echoed the disability rights movement. National coverage of the events confronted many Americans with a foreign image of disability: repudiation of pity and charity, insistence on civil rights. The protest also came at an opportune moment, just over a month before the Americans with Disabilities Act was introduced in Congress. It powerfully symbolized the potential of the disability community, a fitting beginning to a nationwide education about disability and the ADA. Mobilizing the Disability Community In 1988, the top priorities for the disability community were the Civil Rights Restoration Act, which became public law on March 22, 1988, and the Fair Housing Amendments Act, enacted on September 13, 1988. The ADA would not get the spotlight until 1989. However, ADA sponsors and the disability community used 1988 as an opportunity to publicize the act, mobilize grass roots support, solicit the endorsement of presidential candidates, enlist congressional cosponsors, and establish the act as a top priority for the next Congress. The political sophistication attained by the disability community during the 1980s enabled ADA advocates to pursue a multi-pronged strategy to meet its objectives. A Washington-based ADA coalition coordinated these activities in conjunction with the bill s congressional sponsors. Although this coalition did not fully form until 1989, it began to take shape even before the bill s introduction in April, 1988. Describing the emerging leadership is extremely difficult, however, because it was not highly structured. There was no body of voting members that elected officials to formally-defined job positions. There were no department heads. Rather, individuals and a variety of organizations formed a loose (though united) ADA coalition. To facilitate communica tions, the ADA coalition conducted many of its activities under the auspices of the well-estab lished Consortium for Citizens with Disabilities (CCD). Paul Marchand, Director of the Governmental Affairs Office for the Association for Retarded Citizens (ARC), had founded CCD s predecessor, CCDD, in the early 1970s to unite federal advocacy efforts of the disability community. By 1988, the consortium represented dozens of Washington-based organizations. Additional groups enlisted their support to CCD s campaign to pass the ADA. CCD s operations were carried out through multiple task forces, including the Civil Rights Task Force, which from 1988 to 1990 focused almost exclusively on the ADA. Pat Wright of the Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund (DREDF), Liz Savage of the Epilepsy Foundation of America (EFA), and Curt Decker of the National Association of Protection and Advocacy Systems (NAPAS) were the Civil Rights Task Force Co-chairs. The ADA coalition used the task force as its headquarters and CCD stationary for much of its correspondence. Although most of the ADA coalition leaders were from organizations who were members of CCD, it would be misleading to refer to CCD and the ADA coalition interchangeably, since key participants also came from outside CCD. This applied especially to people with disabilities representing the grass roots: ADAPT and NCIL, for example. And Dart, who was a full-fledged supporter and close ally of CCD, nonetheless did not officially represent a CCD member organization: he served the ADA coalition as a voice of the people. The ADA coalition organized its efforts according to four major functions: overall strategy development; education and lobbying; grass roots mobilization; and legal writing and analysis. And it creatively exploited all available resources to accomplish the job, varying the approach to meet changing circumstances. For the most part, participants tended to focus on one of these four areas, but there was overlap. At the core was a handful of leaders who were most responsible for guiding the overall effort. The ADA coalition embraced four major functions: strategy development; education and lobbying; grass roots mobilization; and legal analysis.While many people contributed to developing the overarching strategy for passing the ADA, two persons in particular focused their efforts on this area: Pat Wright and Ralph Neas. Wright s leadership during the ADA s passage eventually earned her the nickname The General. She had attended medical school in the 1960s, but, after a progressive eye disease left her legally blind, she was forced to leave the profession. Temporarily derailed, she found a new interest in assisting persons with disabilities move from institutions to community- based living and gained an intimate knowledge of how legal technicalities affected the lives of persons with disabilities. Wright made her first major inroads to the disability rights movement at the San Francisco sit-in of April, 1977, where she had served as a personal assistant to Judy Heumann and demonstrated her negotiation skills in working with the guards. In her decade of work with DREDF, Wright had refined her extraordinary and tough negotiating techniques. She has [more] hutzpah than anyone I ve ever met, said Eastern Paralyzed Veterans of America (EPVA) attorney Jim Weisman, who worked with her closely during the ADA s passage. Wright certainly made her presence known. Her rejection of standard Washington attire stood out among beltway veterans; one journalist said she appeared as if she had arrived directly from the 1960s Berkeley campus. But Wright was so widely respected in Congress and the White House The ADA s success was due in no small part to Pat Wright s efforts. She has more hutzpah than anyone I ve ever met. Jim Weismanthat her apparel and colorful vocabulary were beyond reproach. She really is brassy, said Weisman, but she got it done. Indeed, the ADA s success was due in no small part to Wright s efforts, though some perceived Wright as a loner because she took advantage of her con tacts and her capabilities to negotiate unilaterally in high-pressured situations. Neas, an attorney and Director of the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights (LCCR), brought to the ADA coalition unparalleled expe rience in civil rights legislation. LCCR carried more than three decades of civil rights advocacy, and was the broadest, the largest, and oldest coalition in the country, with over 185 organizations and their 60 million dues-paying members. It had either assisted or led the coordination of every civil rights bill since 1957. As Executive Director of the LCCR since 1981, Neas led several civil rights campaigns, including the Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act, the Civil Rights Restoration Act, and the Fair Housing Amendments Act. (In 1989, he would begin work on what became the Civil Rights Act of 1991.) In the spring of 1988, Wright approached Neas and the Executive Council to obtain an endorsement of the concept of the ADA. She stressed that the disability community would work with Congress to develop a viable bill after the 1988 election; the important consideration was to lend credibility to the general principles. DREDF s efforts during the 1980s paid off, and LCCR joined the disability community as an indispensable ally. Although Neas did not join the strategy team full-time until he finished with the Civil Rights Restoration Act and Fair Housing Amendments Act, the ADA would become one of his top priorities in January, 1989. While Wright and Neas were the principal strategists, most strategy development did not take place behind closed doors. For example, Savage and Marchand (who focused on lobbying in Washington), Justin Dart and Marilyn Golden (who focused on the grass roots), and Mayerson and Feldblum (who directed legal strategy) all were regular participants in shaping strategy. Moreover, important strategic contributions came from people such as Mary Lou Breslin of DREDF; National Council on Disability (NCD) Chairperson Sandra Parrino; Lex Frieden of The Institute for Rehabilitation and Research (TIRR) and former NCD Executive Director; Paul Hearne of the Dole Foundation; and Jay Rochlin, Executive Director of the President s Committee on the Employment of People with Disabilities. These individuals provided additional contacts in Congress and the administration and also contributed specific statutory recommendations. Such organizations as NCIL and ADAPT brought the concerns of consumer-directed organizations to the table. Further more, when the CCD Civil Rights Task Force began holding weekly strategy meetings in 1989, out- of-town visitors were active participants. Crucial for implementation of strategy was the Washington-based education and lobbying effort. In this respect, Wright worked especially closely with Savage attorney, Assistant Director for Government Affairs of EFA, and Co-chair of the CCD Civil Rights Task Force. Wright and Savage had met in 1985, around the time Savage joined EFA. Together they worked on such landmark civil rights cases as the Handicapped Children s Protection Act, Civil Rights Restoration Act, and Fair Housing Amendments Act. Wright and Savage s strengths complemented one another. Whereas Wright s expertise was in strategy and negotiating, Savage s strength was lobbying. This experience and relationship with Wright naturally evolved into the role of coordinat ing lobbying activities for the ADA coalition. If Wright was the General, Savage was one of the principal Field Commanders. Marchand also played a key role in the education and lobbying effort. As Director of the Governmental Affairs Office of the ARC, Marchand brought to the ADA coalition the resources of one of the nation s largest disability organizations: 1,200 chapters nationwide, and an Action Alert Network that monitored congressional activities and mustered thousands of letters and phone calls. Advocates for persons with developmental disabilities were a well-established and widely-respected presence in Washington, which effectively positioned Marchand for ADA leadership. Moreover, as Chairman of CCD he had an effective platform for working with members of Congress and the administration. To aid in the crucial task of educating members of Congress about disability and lobbying them to be ADA cosponsors, which began even before the ADA was first introduced, the ADA coalition relied on a number of lobbying captains. These included Becky Ogle of the Spina Bifida Association, Bob Williams of the United Cerebral Palsy Associations (UCPA), Denise Rozell of the National Association of Developmental Disabilities Councils (NADDC), Tom Sheridan of the AIDS Action Council, Kathy Megivern of the Association for Education and Rehabilitation of the Blind and Visually Handicapped, Fred Cowell of the Paralyzed Veterans of America (PVA), David Capozzi of the National Easter Seal Society (NESS), Caren Friedman of the Human Rights Campaign Fund, and Curt Decker of the National Association of Protection and Advocacy Systems (NAPAS). These lobbyists in turn worked with members of such organizations as CCD, LCCR, NCIL, the National Organization Responding to AIDS (NORA), and ADAPT. Together they organized lobbying teams to visit senators and congressmen s offices, which supplemented the efforts of congressional sponsors. Victory would be won through the efforts of thousands of advocates across the nation who could humanize and personalize the issues.Although lobbying was important, successful passage of the ADA could not be achieved by efforts only within the Washington beltway. Well before the ADA entered Congress, the ADA coalition concluded that success was dependent on convincing members of Congress, the executive branch, and the general public that the difficulties faced by persons with dis abilities were a genuine national problem. The ADA could not be viewed as the brain-child of a coterie of think-tank intellects; it had to be correctly understood as an outgrowth of the pervasive experience of discrimination. Victory would be won through the efforts of thousands of advocates across the nation who could humanize and personalize the issues, not by privately wrestling with legal technicalities. NCD had begun this process through consumer forums, Justin Dart s public forums, Toward Independence, and The ICD Survey. After the ADA was introduced, Marilyn Golden of DREDF and Justin Dart led these efforts. In 1988, the primary goal of the ADA coalition was to get an army ready. In 1989 and 1990, with a communication system in place, Dart and Golden would issue a nationwide call to arms. There were three main objectives for grass roots mobilization. The first was to educate persons with disabilities about the ADA to prepare them for action. An important part of this process was uniting the fragmented disability community by centering the focus on a common cause. The second was to accumulate evidence of discrimination. This came not only through the standard form of congressional testimony, but also through the novel approach of soliciting discrimination diaries. In addition to providing evidence for Congress, preparing these docu ments would prompt people throughout the country to organize diary parties and foster the empowerment that comes from numbers. Over time, many persons with disabilities had internalized oppression, taken complete responsibility for their situations, and thus turned their backs to discrimination. By writing down their experiences, however, people could face discrimination, recognize society s role, get mad as hell, and lose patience with the circumstances to which they had become acclimated. Third, grass roots mobilization would provide a means to apply pressure on members of Congress and the president. Not only did persons with disabilities write letters, they also joined the lobbying campaign by paying for trips to Washington out of their own pockets. Golden drew on the extensive contacts she had made through administering DREDF disability rights training projects. In the 1980s, DREDF had brought thousands of persons with disabilities to Berkeley to educate them in their rights and teach them how to mobilize communities for action. These persons in turn shared their knowledge with their local communities. Golden supplemented this network by establishing ties to other organizations, such as NCIL, and the ARC, and their grass roots links. The computer network DIMENET was another avenue for mobilizing people around the country. As a result of his public forums, Dart had become famous among people with disabilities around the country, indeed he had become somewhat of a cultural icon for much of the disability community. As he toured the country, Dart kept lists of all the --- * Origin: NFBnet <--> Internet Email Gateway (1:282/1045) --------------- FIDO MESSAGE AREA==> TOPIC: 233 NFB BLIND NEWS Ref: EBY00016Date: 07/28/97 From: JULIE DAWSON Time: 11:00am \/To: ALL (Read 0 times) Subj: 15:Equality of Opportunity -- HISTORY.TX11:00:3307/28/97 From: Julie Dawson Subject: Equality of Opportunity -- HISTORY.TXT (fwd) people who attended, which produced a massive list of people he could later contact for political action. And by spending years touring the country, people in the grass roots felt as if they were part of the ADA s development rather than objects of it. They were thus more willing and eager to join Dart when the time came for action. Dart simply had no equal in getting people mobilized, said Maria Cuprill, a staff member of the House Subcommittee on Select Education. Members of Congress also recognized the need to demonstrate broad-based support for the ADA. Congressman Major R. Owens (D-NY), in particular, devoted considerable energy to empowering the grass roots. Although Owens was a relative newcomer to disability policy, first encountering it after becoming a member of the House Education and Labor Committee in 1983, he brought additional assets. He had experienced the 1960s civil rights movement first-hand, including service as chairman of the Brooklyn chapter of the Congress on Racial Equality (CORE) an organization central to the movement s success. He had also developed a passion for fostering citizen participation. In 1987, Owens became Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Select Education, which had jurisdiction over many disability issues. When he first learned about the ADA prior to its introduction, he thought of it primarily as a civil rights issue: carrying forward the banner for civil rights from African Americans to women to people with disabilities. Owens wanted to do whatever he could to help energize people with disabilities. Accordingly, on May 2, 1988, less than a week after the ADA s introduction, Congressman Owens created the Task Force on the Rights and Empowerment of Americans with Disabilities. The group s purpose was twofold: to present to Congress, the executive branch, and the general public evidence of disability discrimination, and to make recommendations. Owens appointed Dart to be the Chairperson. Dart had testified before Owens s subcommittee as Commissioner of the Rehabilitation Services Administration (RSA), which was part of the Department of Education. Owens thereby discovered that Dart shared his philosophy that disability rights were primarily civil rights. But, following his critical testimony regarding the Department of Education and its paternalistic attitudes toward and policies for people with disabilities, Dart resigned as RSA Commissioner. Owens saw his task force as an opportunity for Dart to continue his mission of achieving civil rights for people with disabilities. Owens named Elizabeth Boggs, of the ARC, as Co-chair with Dart. And Lex Frieden assumed the reins as Coordinator. Thirty-five others from the disability community were selected as task force members. Justin Dart chaired 63 forums in all fifty states, with over 7,000 people in attendance, and collected more than 5,000 documents supporting the ADA.Dart immediately began organizing another series of public forums. As always, Dart s wife Yoshiko was crucial for the management and execution of Dart s activities, which they paid for primarily with their own funds. Justin met Yoshiko in Japan, where Justin worked as president of Japan Tupperware. Yoshiko was a remarkably successful sales representative for the company. In addition to managing his company, which met with great success, Justin used his position as president to assist people with disabilities in attaining better livelihoods. For example, he sponsored sales campaigns in which the company and employees donated profits to buy wheelchairs for persons with disabilities. Justin also provided employment opportunities to boys who used wheel chairs. And Yoshiko took an active role in training them for work and assisting them in building greater self-confidence as productive citizens. Yoshiko s success, capabilities, and interest in disabil ity attracted Justin s attention, who ultimately hired her as an executive assistant. They married in 1968 and became partners in championing the rights of persons with disabilities. Between 1988 and 1990 Justin Dart chaired a total of 63 forums in all fifty states, Guam, and Puerto Rico, with over 7,000 people in attendance overall. Attending a public forum was extraordi narily empowering, said Denise Figueroa of New York. When someone has a disability, she said, one tends to tolerate the discrimination, because it s how you survive. Hearing people talk about their experiences, however, could be a consciousness-raising experience and charge one with a desire to fight for human rights. It was also empowering, said Figueroa, because one realized you weren t alone. While traveling throughout the country, Dart collected upwards of 5,000 documents and tape recordings detailing discrimination, offering proposals, and urging passage of the ADA (see Appendix E for a collection of examples). In addition to people with disabilities, comments came from parents, health care providers, and others who worked with people with disabilities. Virtually every type of disability was represented. Thousands of people filled out petitions titled A vote for justice, which declared support of the ADA and concluded with the invitation: I have personally experienced and/or observed the following discrimination against people with disabilities:. For example, when Gary Janski, who had a psychiatric disability, tried to rent a favorite, vacant apartment, the owner said: we won t rent to your kind. When you re crippled, observed Sheila Sorenson, you get treated like you re a two year old and can t do anything. It makes us feel better to [do] things on our own instead of having everything done for [us], she said. Ree Steidemann described how deaf persons she worked with repeatedly tried to reach hospitals and other institutions through TTY s, where no one answered or people answered and did not know how to use their TTY devices. Please, please help us, wrote Frances Murtagh, an exasperated mother of a child with cerebral palsy. I m at my wits end trying to fight these people alone. In a profound poem, Carolyn Schwartz pleaded: So before you condemn what you don t understand. Let me reach out to you and come touch my hand. Debbie Wimmer described how she overheard a security guard announce: I have a girl in a wheelchair that needs watching. I was speechless. I was hurt. I was mad, wrote Wimmer. Phyllis Geldzalh captured the blunt sentiments of many people with disabilities: It would be a serious injustice if ADA was not passed. In addition to presenting boxes of materials to Congress, the task force issued 11 interim reports to Congress, and prepared 37 statements to leaders in the disability community. Dart also sponsored 14 meetings in Washington and made presentations to various organizations around the country, reaching an estimated 25,000 persons. Moreover, task force members contributed to lobbying efforts by consulting with members of Congress and the executive branch. As a testimony to its dedication to, passion for, and personal investment in disability policy, the task force carried out all its efforts without government funding, through volunteered time and money. And it far exceeded Congressman Owens s expectations. Although the disability community conducted very little legal work on the ADA in 1988, this was the fourth main objective in addition to strategy development, grass roots mobilization, and lobbying. By mid-1989, a legal team was fairly organized. The lead attorney for the disability community, and the one who most often testified before Congress on behalf of the ADA, was Arlene Mayerson of DREDF. She had worked extensively on the Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act, Civil Rights Restoration Act, and Fair Housing Amendments Act, and had submitted countless briefs to various committees and courts. Especially significant was her role in passing the Handicapped Children s Protection Act. Although Mayerson lived in Berkeley, California, during the congressional deliberations on the ADA, Mayerson visited Washington frequently, for weeks at a time, in order to guide legal strategy. Chai Feldblum of the ACLU, who had met Wright while working on the Civil Rights Restoration Act (the first time HIV/AIDS entered a Senate bill for civil rights protections), fulfilled much of the daily responsibilities of legal writing while Mayerson was in California. Although Feldblum specialized in AIDS-related law, and championed the efforts to include persons with HIV and AIDS within the housing provisions, she began developing a firm grasp on general disability law. Mayerson and Feldblum were hardly alone, however. Robert Burgdorf, the original author of the ADA and now a professor at the District of Columbia School of Law, participated in all modifications to the bill and helped ensure continuity from the original version. Tim Cook of the National Disability Action Center offered general guidance as well as his expertise with respect to public accommodations and transportation. Weisman, of EPVA, served as the resident specialist in Transportation. Bonnie Milstein of the Mental Health Law Project offered her expertise concerning mental impairments. Karen Peltz-Strauss, from the National Center for Law and the Deaf, focused on telecommunication provisions. Depending on the issues pressing at any given moment, these and other attorneys worked closely with Congress, disability strategists, and lobbyists to translate disability objectives into proper legal form. Meanwhile, attorneys Robert Funk and Evan Kemp worked on behalf of the disability community within the Bush administration, respectively as a White House negotiator and Chairman of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The massive effort of the disability community was not without its tensions. Many disability organizations had previously been in conflict with one another over limited government resources. As with any coalition, there were tensions between those who held Washington leadership roles and those who worked in the trenches, between inside-the-beltway politicos and persons throughout the rest of the country. Some felt that their views were not being adequately represented in the decision-making process. Others resented claims that persons outside of Washington did not understand the legislative process. There was also tension between persons with disabilities and those without them. It is natural to assume that African-American and women s advocacy groups would be led by African Americans and women. In the disability community, however, one found large numbers of persons without disabilities at the helm. Regardless of the actual impact on policy development and implementation, some persons with disabilities demanded that their own be in charge. The important point, however, is not the presence of these tensions, but the way in which the disability community overcame them. No subgroup of people with any type of physical or mental disability, or perceived disability, . . . will be sacrificed. Task Force on the Rights andEmpowerment of Americanswith DisabilitiesThere was something in the ADA for every one. Virtually all disability sub-groups wanted to, and subsequently did, champion the goals of the ADA. With few exceptions, they were united in the commitment that there would be no long term legitimation of unequal status for people with dis abilities. Full realization of the goals might take decades, but they wanted to undercut any national policies that would promote discrimination indefinitely. The disability community made a second important commitment. There would be no splintering with respect to the ADA: No subgroup of people with any type of physical or mental disability, or perceived disability, no matter how politically impotent or how stigmatized, will be sacrificed. And they would fight each other s battles. Advocates for persons with mental retardation pushed for ending discrimination against AIDS; people with epilepsy argued for the need for accessible transportation; and individuals using wheelchairs urged that persons with mental disabilities equally deserved freedom from employment discrimination. Even at the most intense moments in congressional deliberations, the community would stick together. The Government Response While persons with disabilities throughout the country were mobilizing to learn about and support the ADA, the general public remained largely unaware of the legislation. Prior to the ADA s introduction, The Washington Post pointed to the ADA as a potential rallying point for the disability community. But there was virtually no mainstream press coverage, either of the bill s introduction, or during the rest of 1988. This was due in part to the lateness of the bill s entree to Congress. Since the ADA s advocates were not pushing for immediate passage, the bill drew neither the press coverage nor the opposition it would when the bill became a serious proposal in 1989. Individuals throughout the country, however, helped raise consciousness about the ADA by talking with their circles of friends and family. And scores of disability and non-disability organizations endorsed the ADA and funneled information to their members. Disability and congressional advocates focused much more on the executive branch and Congress than on the general public. The ADA was first introduced, as Congressman Coelho said, to just get reaction, to get people to respond. A prominent executive branch voice was Evan Kemp, who approached the issue both as a Commissioner of EEOC and as a disability rights advocate. He made his first public declaration on the ADA before hundreds of people at the Employers Banquet of the President s Committee on Employment of the Handicapped. The event took place in the International Ballroom of the Washington Hilton Hotel, just a week after the bill s introduction on May 5. Kemp wanted a bill that President Bush could support and therefore alerted people to problematic provisions. Kemp spoke primarily about employment issues, of how it made good business sense to tap the market of disabled persons by promoting accessibility, and good government sense to reduce federal spending through employment. For these reasons he applauded the ADA, but he also questioned its current form. Kemp thought the bill needed to be more detailed to avoid control by bureaucratic regulators. He was especially concerned about the definition of reasonable accommodation (see Appendix F), and advocated federal economic assistance to employers to ease the economic burden the ADA might cause. He also thought the proposed limit on reasonable --- * Origin: NFBnet <--> Internet Email Gateway (1:282/1045) --------------- FIDO MESSAGE AREA==> TOPIC: 233 NFB BLIND NEWS Ref: EBY00017Date: 07/28/97 From: JULIE DAWSON Time: 11:00am \/To: ALL (Read 0 times) Subj: 16:Equality of Opportunity -- HISTORY.TX11:00:3307/28/97 From: Julie Dawson Subject: Equality of Opportunity -- HISTORY.TXT (fwd) accommodations was unrealistic because an employer would have to demonstrate either that the business would be fundamentally changed or that it would be forced to file bankruptcy. The definition of handicap (see Appendix F) was also problematic for Kemp. He proposed a restricted definition that focused on what he termed the truly disabled : the severely handicapped and persons excluded because of myths, fears and stereotypes. Kemp s emphasis on the vagueness of language, limits for accommodation, and definition of disability, foreshadowed several issues that would dominate congressional deliberations. A vigorous response came from Thomas M. Boyd, Acting Assistant Attorney General, who presented the position of the Reagan administration. While the administration is deeply committed to the goal of bringing individuals with handicaps into the mainstream of American life, wrote Boyd, we have very serious reservations about the extent and standards of the ADA. Highlighting the potential costs associated with disability rights, and rejecting the link to provisions for minori ties and women, Boyd emphasized the need to keep the pursuit of equal opportunity within manageable bounds. Especially problematic were the ways in which the ADA departed from Section 504 in two ways: first, by requiring barrier removal uniformly for both existing and new facilities; second, by incorporating the utterly unrealistic and extreme provision that a business could defend itself against charges of discrimination only if its basic existence was threatened by the cost of accommodations. The administration objected to the ADA s novel definitions of handicap and reasonable accommodation, and questioned the application of reasonable accommodation beyond employment settings. Boyd also repudiated the proposal for requiring all new transportation vehicles to be accessible, and demurred to ordering implementation of universal design in new housing. Finally, the administration proposed a more limited standard of accessibility to public accommodations, and demanded that the effective date for the bill be delayed at least a year. The ADA was introduced in 1988 to solicit the endorsement of presidential candidates and induce them to outbid one another.Although the Reagan administration, as illus trated in Boyd s letter, was at best cautious in its sup port of the ADA, the disability community s sights were set on the next president. In fact, one of the principal reasons for introducing the ADA in 1988 was to use the politics of a presidential election year to solicit candidate endorsement and induce the candi dates to outbid one another. People in the disability community correctly believed that presidential support was crucial for the ADA s success. They worked for both campaigns to encourage disabled persons to vote and make disability a campaign issue. They had some leverage. On June 30, 1988, the Louis Harris polling company determined that the disability community comprised 10 percent of the electorate, was a force to be reckoned with in the politics of the future, and could be the deciding factor in a close election. Vice President Bush s personal experience with disability shaped his relationship with the disability community. He had a daughter who died from leukemia, a son with a learning disability, an uncle with quadriplegia, and a son whose cancer required a plastic ostomy bag. In conjunction with his leadership of President Reagan s Task Force on Regulatory Relief, his support of the disability community had grown steadily since 1983. This was due in no small part to Kemp, who worked with Bush by writing many of his public statements. I am going to do whatever it takes to make sure the disabled are included in the mainstream. For too long, they have been left out, but they are not going to be left out anymore. Vice President George Bush In the September issue of the disability magazine Mainstream, Kemp faced off with Timothy Cook of the Public Interest Law Center of Philadelphia (PILCOP) to argue the respective attributes of the two presidential candidates. Kemp noted how, on March 1, 1988, Vice President Bush wrote to the Gallaudet Board of Trustees and urged the Board to set an example and . . . appoint a president who is not only highly qualified, but who is also deaf. A month before the ADA was introduced, on March 31, Bush also pledged to support legislation pro viding persons with disabilities the same pro tection in private employment that is now en joyed by women and minorities. Kemp noted how Bush made an even stronger commitment when he participated in the swearing in ceremony of Paul Hearne as Executive Director of the National Council on Disability, on August 12, 1988. Bush s presence alone, before nearly 100 persons with disabilities and the organization that authored the original ADA, symbolized his support of the disability community. But Bush went further and, while he did not endorse the ADA introduced to Congress, said that he would promote a civil rights act for people with disabilities. Kemp s efforts in courting Bush also bore fruit at the Republican convention in August, where Bush incorporated the rights of disabled persons into his acceptance speech. He did not say much, but it was the first time disability was included on such an occasion: I am going to do whatever it takes to make sure the disabled are included in the mainstream. For too long, they have been left out, but they are not going to be left out anymore. Cook, a leading disability advocate for Dukakis, focused on Michael Dukakis s strong record on disability as Governor of Massachusetts. Similar to other states, Massachusetts provided full access for persons with disabilities in all state-assisted programs and activities. It was also one of few states to have an executive-level independent agency to enforce disability civil rights. Cook noted that Governor Dukakis strengthened enforcement mechanisms for accessibility standards, including barrier-free sidewalks and roadways. He also made concerted efforts to recruit persons with disabilities for government offices, including high-level leadership positions such as the Massachusetts s Rehabilitation Commission. Moreover, Governor Dukakis had augmented Massachusetts health insurance, attendant care, and education programs for persons with disabili ties. Yet, while Dukakis promoted accessibility in campaign functions and gave a mild endorse ment to the principles of the ADA, he did not court the disability community as vigorously as Vice President Bush. In addition to his personal experiences with disability, Bush s leadership of the Task Force on Regulatory Relief and the disability community s defensive effort helped convinced Bush of the power of the community as a voting block: it commanded respect and could pay high dividends. Bush did not let the opportunity escape him. For example, at the suggestion of Kemp he made a point to incorporate disability issues into his presidential debates. Dukakis, on the other hand, was facing criticism that he and the Democratic party were too beholden to interest groups, which led him to downplay rather than accentuate direct appeals to specific constituencies such as persons with disabilities. He thereby alienated much of the disability community. Some of Dukakis s tempered support of the disability community may in fact be attributed to the disability community itself. Some disability advocates had advised Dukakis not to come out too strong on behalf of the ADA. Their goal was to have both candidates endorse the principles of the ADA so that whoever was elected would be on their side. They thus wanted to encourage Bush to support the ADA by giving him room to outbid Dukakis, rather than make Bush feel as if he needed to contrast himself with Dukakis by being more reserved in his support of the ADA. ADA advocates also sought the support of members of Congress. The disability community joined congressional staff and members in a cosponsorship drive that began before the ADA was first introduced and continued throughout the entire session of Congress. Cosponsorship is crucial to the success of any bill. It promises affirmative votes and enables advocates to gauge the level of support. Cosponsorship is also important because, if one can achieve a cross-section of party and ideology, it helps thwart reflexive, negative reaction and partisan labeling. Although ADA advocates anticipated a high level of cosponsorship because they presented the ADA as a civil rights bill, the process proved to be very difficult. Members did not take the issue of costs lightly and were reluctant to attach their name simply because someone else had done so. Nevertheless, by the close of the 100th Congress on October 22, 1988, 26 senators and 117 representatives had endorsed the bill. Congressional Hearings The message was clear: persons with disabilities struggled with unequal opportunities; they confronted not only the challenges of their impairments, but also the barriers society erects; federal action was necessary to remedy the situation.The highlights of the 1988 ADA campaign were the congressional hearings held in September and October. On September 27, 1988, the Senate Subcommittee on the Handicapped and the House Subcommittee on Select Education held a joint hearing in the Hart Senate Office Building. On October 24, the House Subcommittee on Select Education held a hearing in the Lafayette Hotel of Boston, Massachusetts. These hearings were not intended to be substantive examinations of the ADA s provisions. This bill is not going anywhere this year, Senator Tom Harkin (D-IA) said flatly at the joint hearing. Senator Lowell P. Weicker, Jr. (R-CT) also conceded that the real battle would not begin until Congress reconvened in 1989. But Weicker emphasized the need to get disability discrimina tion on the table for immediate discussion: If there is silence now, there will be silence later. If there is indifference to discrimination now, there will be indifference later. The purpose was therefore to establish a record of discrimina tion to humanize the ICD Survey data with the lives of real persons and make congressional inaction on the ADA intolerable. Of the 95 witnesses at the two hearings, there was not a single technical expert speaking to the details of the bill. Only seven federal and state government officials testified. The remaining witnesses were all from the disability community persons and parents of persons with disabilities, and people who worked with disabled persons in such settings as independent living centers who spoke of their own experiences. This was, therefore, the first instance in which a congressional hearing regarding disability was dominated by the presence of people with disabilities. Some of the predicaments identified by witnesses were not even issues that the ADA addressed. But the message was clear: persons with disabilities struggled with unequal opportunities; they confronted not only the challenges of their impairments, but also the barriers society erects; federal action was necessary to remedy the situation. The joint hearing in the Hart Senate Office Building overflowed with eager spectators, many of them disabled, and many having traveled hundreds of miles to participate. Around 200 people with disabilities came to Washington for the event from New Jersey alone. Senator Weicker actually had to stop the proceedings to attend to space needs; he asked those present to rotate so that others watching on television could have a chance to be in the hearing room. The stories of those who testified were gripping and spoke volumes. Mary Linden, who had been unable to walk since early childhood as a result of physicians surgical errors, launched the first panel. She described her struggles with a public school that considered her unworthy of education. It was not until after Linden graduated from a disability- segregated high school in 1951 that she learned how to write, and then only because she taught herself. Subsequently she spent over two decades accumulating 61 hours of college credit. To her dismay, she could not enroll in a four-year college because of inaccessible public transportation. She therefore had to do all of her work through correspondence. Linden said she desperately wanted to finish her degree because it was necessary for attaining what she significantly termed the most precious thing in the world a paying job! I beg you to pass this bill, she pleaded, so that other children will not have to face the same barriers. Twelve-year-old Jade Calegory followed Linden s testimony and, compared with Linden, presented the stark contrast of what opportunity could do. Jade praised the Federal Government for passing the Education for all Handicapped Children Act because the act enabled him, with his spina bifida and wheelchair, to join the rest of his community s children in the public school. Jade starred in the movie Mac and Me, which he described as terrific because it shows a kid with a disability giving help instead of just getting help, and nobody tries to cure me or take away my disability by the end of the movie. That gives people the idea that it is okay to be disabled and just be accepted for who you are. Jade also described his passion for participating in wheelchair races. But he reported that he would get frustrated when he tried to ride a bus home. Most of the buses do not have lifts on them. Some of the drivers are very rude and get mad if I want to take the bus. Can you believe that? I work and part of my taxes pay for public buses, and then they get mad just because I am using a wheelchair. Accessible buses were important, said Jade, because it is hard for people to feel good about themselves if they have to crawl up the stairs of a bus, or if the driver passes by without stopping. Dan Piper and his mother, Sylvia Piper, illustrated the uncertainty they faced because of Dan s developmental disability. Although the Pipers were told that Dan s condition was hopeless when he was a young child, and that Dan should be institutionalized, they decided to keep him at home. Ultimately he joined the special education program of an integrated public school, where he took courses with non-disabled peers, helped manage the football team, and became the lead performer in a traveling high school lip-sync group. The Pipers were worried, however, about what would happen to Dan when he finished school and wanted to fulfill his dream of getting a job and living in his own apartment. Will the landlord decide, because Dan has --- * Origin: NFBnet <--> Internet Email Gateway (1:282/1045) --------------- FIDO MESSAGE AREA==> TOPIC: 233 NFB BLIND NEWS Ref: EBY00018Date: 07/28/97 From: JULIE DAWSON Time: 11:00am \/To: ALL (Read 0 times) Subj: 17:Equality of Opportunity -- HISTORY.TX11:00:3307/28/97 From: Julie Dawson Subject: Equality of Opportunity -- HISTORY.TXT (fwd) mental retardation, that he is incapable of independent living? Will he be denied access to transportation? Will restaurants refuse service? Will hotels refuse accommodations? The Pipers viewed the ADA as a much- needed extension in disability policy: It is now time to expand handicapped antidiscrimination to the private sector so that Dan s and our visions for his adult life and the lives of many others can finally become a reality. Judith Heumann s polio resulted in paralysis. Despite her remarkably successful career, she was burdened by the psychological impact of discrimination. She described how she could not enter public school as a child because she was considered a fire hazard. When she graduated from high school, the principal tried to prevent her from accepting her diploma on stage because of her wheelchair. In college, she was denied her elementary school teaching credentials because of her paralysis: administrators did not think she could teach from a wheelchair. On one occasion, officials at an auction house attempted to remove Heumann and a friend because they were allegedly disgusting to look at. People do not emerge unscathed from these experiences, concluded Heumann: this stigma scars for life. Belinda Mason knew stigma first-hand. At the age of 30, Mason had been diagnosed HIV- positive after a blood transfusion. Moreover, a stroke left her partially paralyzed. I have learned a terrible truth about America, she said of her subsequent experiences, that it is not a good place to be different or to be ill, in spite of what we teach in government class. She related that her 75- person town closed the community pool for a week after she entered it, ostensibly because of a cigarette butt. One neighbor carried around a petition demanding that she move out. Mason described another woman who lost her job simply because she decided to have her son, who had AIDS, live at home. She also told of one occasion where police locked a man with AIDS in his car overnight, rather than take him into jail. The next day, people peered through the windows at him as if looking in an aquarium. Mason acknowledged that one cannot simply legislate attitudes and behavior. But she poignantly added: The truth is that sometimes legislation precedes and enhances humanity. Mason was the first person with HIV ever to testify before Congress. And her moving testimony earned her an appointment to the President s Committee on the Human Immunodefi ciency Virus Epidemic. Congressman Owens organized the field hearing in Boston at the request of Dart and others from the New England disability community. The purpose was to solicit an even more extensive demonstration of citizen participation. It was an unforgettable day, said Owens, for the range of disabilities represented, the racial and gender diversity, and the united spirit of those in attendance. Everyone wanted the chance to address Congress. To accommodate as many people as possible, the subcommittee met nonstop from 9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.: over 80 witnesses testified in rapid-fire succession, each having but a few minutes to relate his or her experiences. William Cavanaugh, a consumer of the Massachusetts mental health system, spoke about the abusive treatment practices and human rights violations of persons in mental institutions. He described one man, Vincent Veletia, who suffocated and died after being restrained with a full sensory deprivation hood, replete with ear phones emitting constant static, and being forced into a fetal position with his hands cuffed behind his knees. Bonnie O Day described how a prominent disability advocate from Charlottesville, Franz Stielfried, died because of poor accessibility. Impeded by an intersection without curb cuts, Stielfried tried to cross a dangerous, grassy area next to a 50-foot drop. While trying to lower himself over another curb, however, he lost control of his wheelchair and fell over the cliff to his death. He had been traveling to a meeting to demand for greater accessibility. You know, sometimes I almost wish a person would hate me for being disabled. Then at least I would know they knew I was alive. Anonymous Nancy Husted-Jensen described how fully-registered disabled persons were turned away from voting booths because they supposedly did not look sufficiently competent to vote. Eileen Healy Horndt similarly recounted how one man with mental retardation was barred from opening a savings account at a local bank because he did not fit the image the bank wants to project. She spoke of another gentlemen with quadriplegia who joined her in visiting a presidential campaign office to discuss accessibility, but there was no handicap parking space wide enough for the van lift. Horndt also described her own frus tration of having to use a calling card at pay telephones because she could not reach the coin slot. Only after the Disability Law Center of Boston threatened legal action did Barbara Waters avoid leaving college when administrators said her epileptic seizures represented a liability risk. Eleanor Blake was not so fortunate. After being hospitalized for manic depression, college officials denied her graduation from the human services program because, they said, she was not psycho logically fit. Later, after switching majors, she graduated summa cum laude. Patricia Deegan further illustrated the excessive discrimination persons with mental illness face, including the assumption that what we say about our own experiences is an expression of a disordered mind and can therefore be ignored. Presumed to be crazy, one s basic civil rights were readily violated. Deegan related how one woman reported to mental health workers that she was pregnant, but the professionals dismissed her claim as delusional. Later she visited an emergency room only to be met with the same response. That evening, while roaming the streets in desperation, the woman miscarried and suffered from serious hemorrhaging. We are not asking for pity. We are not even asking for your sympathy. All we ask is that you make real the promises and opportunities that America strives to offer everyone. Denise Karuth These examples capture only a small fraction of the testimony presented about lost education and employment opportunities, physical and transportation barriers, social stigma, and violation of basic human rights. But the problem came not only from actions committed, it also came from simple avoidance. Michael Oestreicher related how one frustrated, member of a group discuss ing beach accessibility poignantly declared: You know, sometimes I almost wish a person would hate me for being disabled. Then at least I would know they knew I was alive. In a discrimination diary presented to the committee, Cynthia Miller captured the exasperation evident in these sentiments and those of many other persons with disabilities. I got home late this evening and did the things most Americans do like cooking, cleaning, feeding the cat, Miller wrote. Then she prepared a list of things she thought needed to be changed to improve the lives of persons with disabilities. I thought of doing all these things, but the list seems to grow every day. Instead, I got angry and depressed. I got angry and depressed because after I work all day, fight the barriers to get to work, [and] fight the barriers to do the things all Americans do like shop, I have meetings and phone calls and letters and other things I have to do to fight for my equal rights as an American with a disability. I m tired of being tired, frightened, angry and depressed every day, fighting for my rights. And now, I m writing a stupid diary until 2:00 in the morning to prove that discrimination exists to my Congress. Why does Congress think so many Americans are fighting this battle if discrimination doesn t exist? Does Congress think we enjoy or prefer to fight for equal rights before we eat or sleep sometimes? . . . I would like to watch The Cosby Show, with slippers on my feet, and time on my hands, like other Americans. I don t want to be Rosa Parks. I just want to be Cyndy Miller. Denise Karuth, who used a wheelchair because of multiple sclerosis and was legally blind, eloquently stated what people like herself and Cyndy Miller were fighting for. We are not asking for your money, she explained. We are not asking for pity. We are not even asking for your sympathy. All we ask is that you make real the promises and opportunities that America strives to offer everyone: the respect and dignity we deserve as free and responsible citizens. The hearings were captivating and televised on C-Span. Savage used a copy of the proceed ings to edit a 30-minute version and make it available all around the country. She became known as the Girl Scout Cookie-Lady for her persistence in pushing the video on people. Dart also played a crucial role in spreading the edited hearings by taking copies with him as he traveled around the country for his public forums. People could use the video to explain what disability discrimination was all about and draw on the testimony for examples of how to describe their own experiences. The ADA on the Eve of the 1988 Election The ADA of 1988 fulfilled its mission. The goal was to get the ADA on the legislative agenda as a congressional priority.Although no further action was taken on the ADA in 1988, the ADA did not die, as some people claimed, when Congress closed its 100th Session on October 22. On the contrary, the ADA of 1988 fulfilled its mission. ADA sponsors never intended it to come to a vote that year. The goal, rather, was to complete the process begun by the National Council on Disability in getting the ADA on the legislative agenda, not only as a token measure, but as a congressional priority. The disability community reached this objective with a pronounce ment from Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D-MA) at the joint hearing. I just want to give the assurance, he asserted, that this will be the first order of business when Congress convenes for the 101st session in 1989. The disability community had begun its education process, both internally and with members of Congress and presidential candidates. Members were learning more about what it meant to be disabled. They were being exposed to scores of people with disabilities for the first time. Many declared their support by becoming cosponsors of the bill. The disability community was also becoming much more optimistic at the close of 1988. The 1980s had been a decade of struggle against encroachments. But the Civil Rights Restoration Act symbolized the new alliance formed with the civil rights community. And the Fair Housing Amendments Act broke new ground by extending disability policy to encompass the private sector. The Reagan administration was winding to a close, and the tide was apparently turning. Both presidential candidates had vowed to support legislation akin to the ADA. By the end of 1988, the compelling problem of discrimination had been fused with the solution crafted by the National Council on Disability. The political climate was also changing in a way that would invite, rather than impede, future action. 4 Creating a Workable ADA: The Senate and the White House On November 8, 1988, George Bush defeated Michael Dukakis in the election for President of the United States. Bush s strong statements in support of the disability community, and particularly civil rights legislation for people with disabilities, had swayed many disabled voters, including many Democrats. In fact, a poll of voter intentions on the eve of the election, conducted by Louis Harris and Associates, suggested that the wide margin of persons with disabilities support ing Bush was a deciding factor in the election. Although many persons with disabilities had campaigned for Dukakis and were disappointed by the outcome, Bush s election clearly offered an opportunity to the disability community. His attentiveness to disability issues signaled a change in the political climate and made passage of the ADA seem more promising. Moreover, two days before his inauguration, Bush avowed his intent to follow through on his pledges and push the ADA toward passage. I said during the campaign that disabled people have been excluded for far too long from the mainstream of American life, Bush noted. One step that I have discussed will be action on the Americans with Disabilities Act in order, in simple fairness, to provide the disabled with the same rights afforded others, afforded other minorities. In another respect, however, the election of 1988 was damaging to the ADA cause. Senator Lowell P. Weicker, Jr. (R-CT), a long-time supporter of persons with disabilities and the Senate sponsor of the ADA in 1988, lost his bid for reelection to Joseph Lieberman. As one senate staff member said, Weicker was one of the 5ive-hundred-pound gorillas in Congress. His leadership in the area of disability was consistent and strong. Now someone else had to fill the void he left. The chief cosponsor of the 1988 ADA was Senator Tom Harkin (D-IA), who had worked closely with Weicker, the National Council on the Handicapped (NCD), and the disability community in the development of the ADA. Weicker and Harkin had even discussed whether Harkin s position as Chairman of the Subcommittee on the Handicapped placed him in the best position to be the original sponsor in 1988. Harkin also had a personal understanding of the need for the ADA because of his brother, who was deaf. It was therefore natural for Harkin to assume Senate leadership. But it was not a foregone conclusion. I didn t get elected to get re-elected. My brother is deaf. I understand discrimination. . . . We are doing this legislation. Senator Tom Harkin Sponsorship of the ADA was a risky endeavor for the first-term senator. He was up for reelection in 1990, and no Democratic senator from Iowa had ever won a second term. As a relative newcomer to disability policy, Senator Harkin would have to begin his relationship with the disabil ity community by making compromises with respect to provisions in the ADA potentially alienat ing the people he was trying to help. Moreover, failure to pass the bill rapidly might lead some people to compare the leadership skills of Senators Harkin and Weicker. By sponsoring the ADA, Harkin would also become a target for the opposition, which included employers, transit operators, owners of public accommodations, railroads, telecommunications providers, and state and local governments. Finally, the prospects for successfully expanding civil rights protec tions to --- * Origin: NFBnet <--> Internet Email Gateway (1:282/1045) --------------- FIDO MESSAGE AREA==> TOPIC: 233 NFB BLIND NEWS Ref: EBY00019Date: 07/28/97 From: JULIE DAWSON Time: 11:00am \/To: ALL (Read 0 times) Subj: 18:Equality of Opportunity -- HISTORY.TX11:00:3307/28/97 From: Julie Dawson Subject: Equality of Opportunity -- HISTORY.TXT (fwd) incorporate an additional class of people, while improved with the change in administration, re mained uncertain at best. Sponsoring the ADA and risking failure could potentially jeopardize Senator Harkin s political career. Although Robert Silverstein, Staff Director and Chief Counsel for the Subcommittee on the Handicapped, cautioned him about the pitfalls, Harkin accepted the challenge. I didn t get elected to get re-elected, he told Silverstein. My brother is deaf. I understand discrimination. I understand what it means and what this country can look like in thirty years. We are doing this legislation. Master Strategy and the Retooling of the ADA Senator Harkin took the lead in preparing the ADA for reintroduction. Success depended on developing a solid strategy for maneuvering the bill through the treacherous terrain of Congress. It also required attaining the complete backing of the disability community. Harkin s first step was to establish an effective relationship with Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D-MA) and Carolyn Senator Kennedy brought the experience of decades of civil rights leadership in addition to his stature as a heavy hitter senator with seniority.Osolinik and Michael Iskowitz from Kennedy s committee staff. This was important because a bill successfully voted out of Harkin s Subcommittee on the Hand icapped would have to clear Kennedy s Committee on Labor and Human Resources. Coordination of all leg islative activities with Kennedy could improve the possibility of a smooth and quick transition to the Sen ate floor. The disability community was also courting the support of Kennedy. They hoped his stature as a heavy hitter senator with seniority could match the standing of Senator Weicker and augment the efforts of Harkin. Kennedy brought the experience of decades of civil rights leadership. Osolinik, whom Pat Wright described as one of few people who really saw disability as a civil rights issue, directed civil rights issues in Kennedy s office. Moreover, Kennedy had personal experiences with disability through his son who lost a leg to cancer and a sister with a developmental disability. Kennedy s support, however, depended on making significant changes to the ADA. Senators Harkin and Kennedy concluded that the bill introduced in 1988 was too ambitious and stood little chance for passage. Therefore, they decided to rewrite the ADA. In accordance with the objectives of the disability community, the senators primary goal was to achieve the best possible civil rights coverage for persons with disabilities. Toward this end, they and their staffs, in consultation with leaders from the disability community, developed a four-pronged legislative strategy. First, Senators Kennedy and Harkin made a commitment to achieving bipartisanship. They believed that the ultimate goal of legislation must not simply be to pass a bill, but rather to make an enforceable law. For the bill to be taken seriously, it needed to be widely supported by the business community as well as the disability community, Republicans and Democrats, the Senate and the House, and the Bush administration. Second, Senators Harkin and Kennedy wanted to craft a bill that could withstand the strict scrutiny of Congress. Rather than introduce a bill with aggressive provisions and rely on subsequent negotiations, which ran the risk of permanently labeling the bill extreme, they hoped to hold extensive discussions and reach important compromises before they even introduced the bill. While the ADA s complete effect would not be immediately apparent, the American landscape would be transformed for subsequent generations.The third and fourth strategic commitments followed logically: modesty and parity. The original ADA applied rigorous and rigid standards of accessibility that would be implemented immediately. Senators Kennedy and Harkin instead promoted accessibility at some point in time, and varied provisions according to specific circum stances. While the bill s complete effect would not be apparent immediately following its enactment, the American landscape would be transformed for subsequent generations. Finally, in crafting the actual lan guage of the bill, Silverstein and Osolinik worked with the disability community to build the ADA securely on the foundation of earlier legislation especially on the Civil Rights Act, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and the Fair Housing Amendments Act (See Appendix B). Proponents could therefore argue that the bill was an application of tested principles, not a new creation. With this strategy in place, Osolinik and Silverstein began 1989 by reviewing the bill line by line. Redrafting the ADA was not, however, a solitary endeavor. After developing their own preliminary ideas about what provisions should constitute a new bill, Silverstein and Osolinik turned to others to identify interests in and reservations about the bill, including the disability community, all covered entities, the Bush administration, and members of Congress and their staffs. The principal House contacts were Congressman Tony Coelho (D-CA) and Rochelle Dornatt from his staff. Especially helpful from the business community was Nancy Reed Fulco of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Osolinik and Silverstein worked most closely, however, with a group of representa tives from the disability community. In addition to the general guidance provided by Pat Wright, Ralph Neas, Liz Savage, and Paul Marchand, Silverstein and Osolinik received technical expertise from attorneys Arlene Mayerson, Chai Feldblum, Robert Burgdorf, Jim Weisman, and others according to specialties. By retooling the bill in close cooperation with this group, Osolinik and Silverstein hoped to earn the backing of the disability community. Then they could present a united front as the bill went through Congress. From January to March, 1989, Silverstein and Osolinik produced scores of different drafts of the ADA. By March 15 they completed a draft (S. 933), which they circulated privately to represen tatives of the disability community, the Bush administration, and several members of Congress. The bill duplicated the findings and purpose of the original bill (S. 2345) crafted by NCD (see 2 in Appendix H). It also covered the same main areas, with the exception of housing (which had been addressed by the Fair Housing Amendments Act). S. 933 even incorporated some language of S. 2345 verbatim. But there were marked distinctions. The new bill, S. 933, demonstrated the commitment to modesty and flexibility in standards by tailoring definitions, provisions, and enforcement to four main titles Employment, Public Services, Public Accommodations, and Telecommunications. The dedication to legal precedent was also clear. S. 933, for example, incorporated more than five times as many references to earlier statutes. There was also a difference in tone. Whereas the original bill, S. 2345, emphasized discriminatory practices that should not be tolerated for example, providing unequal services S. 933 spelled out positive, proactive steps that must be taken to meet nondiscriminatory standards. Several major revisions are worth noting. One of the most contested aspects of the ADA was the definition of disability (see Appendix F). People asked: Who would be protected by the ADA? It was a difficult question because one cannot readily identify disability with the same precision that one can identify, for example, race and gender. It would also be impractical to name, in a statute, each and every type of disability. This would be cumbersome, if not impossible, and require constant adjustment for future, unknown impairments. The challenge, therefore, was to find a definition that was at once inclusive enough to cover diverse disabilities, but not so universal that anyone could claim protec tion by the ADA. Under the original bill, S. 2345, a disability was defined as a physical or mental impairment, perceived impairment, or a record of impairment. This definition was similar to the three-pronged definition implemented under Section 504, except that it did not limit the first prong to impairments that substantially limit major life activities. This meant that anyone with any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss or any mental or psychological disorder was covered. Osolinik and Silverstein instead used the Section 504 standard and restricted the first prong to a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities such as seeing, walking, self-care, and learning. This meant that a physical impairment such as an infected finger would not constitute a disability. The most controversial issue in the redrafting stage was the cost and burden imposed upon covered entities. Legislative endeavors of the 1980s successfully established that, in the area of disability civil rights, equal treatment was not enough. The goal had to be equal opportunity. That required modifying policies, providing services, and breaking down barriers: reasonable accommodations (see Appendix F). In other words, it was not enough simply to leave the door open, the door also had to be widened. And this meant that civil rights for persons with disabilities could cost money. But at what point does providing equal opportunity become an unreasonable burden? Under S. 2345, the only defensible limits to providing accommodations were actions that would fundamentally alter the essential nature, or threaten the existence of, the program, activity, business, or facility in question. Although Burgdorf wrote the provision to assure that compliance would not mean shutting down a business, it came to be known pejoratively as the bankruptcy provision: interpreted to mean that a business would have to go to the brink of bankruptcy before it could defend against charges of discrimination. S. 933, on the other hand, followed Section 504 in using undue hardship (see Appendix F) as the standard for determining whether employment accommodations were reasonable. Undue hardship meant an action that is unduly costly, extensive, substantial, disruptive, or that will fundamentally alter the nature of the program. It was not a fixed concept, but rather varied on a case-by-case basis, according to such factors as the size of the business, the type of operation, and the nature and cost of the accommoda tion. Concern for cost shaped the new approach to barrier removal. S. 2345 required the retrofit ting of all public transportation vehicles and facilities to make them accessible. S. 933, on the other hand, varied its demands according to whether vehicles and facilities were newly constructed or already in operation. The general principle was that all new vehicles and transportation facilities would have to be readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities (see Appendix F). For used vehicles, transportation operators had to make good faith efforts to find accessible vehicles. If a company remanufactured a vehicle to extend its life for at least five years, it had to be made readily accessible to the maximum extent feasible. With regard to existing facilities, S. 933 required only that certain key stations had to be retrofitted for accessibility. The approach in S. 933 to barrier removal in public accommodations paralleled the transpor tation provisions. The original bill, S. 2345, required that nearly every place of public accommoda tion had to remove all barriers within five years. This provision earned S. 2345 the nickname of the flat earth bill. Drafters of S. 933, however, dispensed with the idea of wholesale retrofitting. Instead they required that all new construction be accessible. Nevertheless, they did not want to leave existing structures untouched. Consequently, drafters created a new legal term. S. 933 required that businesses make changes to existing structures where accessibility was readily achievable (see Appendix F), which was eventually defined to mean easily accomplishable and able to be carried out without much difficulty or expense. The goal was to create a mind-set of accessibility, to encourage people to look for creative ways to make the world more accessible. Readily achievable modifications might include installing grab bars, ramping a few steps, lowering telephones, adding raised letter and braille markings on elevator controls, and adding flashing alarm lights. S. 933 also required that where structural changes were not readily achievable, covered entities had to make their services available through alternative methods: for example, coming to the doorway of a Laundromat to pick up laundry when a person could not get inside. Moreover, the bill required the provision of auxiliary aids and services (see Appendix F) to persons with disabilities: for example, reading a menu to persons with visual impairments so that they could fully enjoy the benefits of places of public accommodation. The version of the ADA crafted by Senators Harkin and Kennedy did not only limit initial provisions. In one significant area they significantly expanded the scope of the original bill. Under S. 2345, only those public accommodations (see Appendix F) covered under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 had to be accessible. This principally meant places of lodging, eating, and entertainment. Service establishments such as doctors offices, retail stores, and private clubs, were not included. S. 933, by contrast, defined within its scope virtually every privately-operated establishment that was used by the general public and affected commerce. This included places of lodging, office buildings, parks, recreation facilities, theaters, retail stores, medical facilities, and restaurants. Although this apparently broke the commitment to parity with the Civil Rights Act, advocates argued that it was consistent in spirit: just as the Civil Rights Act addressed the universe where race discrimination was an issue, the ADA covered the broader universe where disability discrimination was relevant. The new draft of the ADA also took steps to define the original ADA s prohibition of discrimination in broadcasts, communications, or telecommunications. S. 933 required that communications providers implement telecommunication relay services. A relay service enabled an individual using a Telecommunication Device for the Deaf (TDD) a machine that transmits typed data over telephone lines to communicate with someone without such a device, through an operator who would translate text to voice, and voice to text. Another significant change from S. 2345 concerned legal --- * Origin: NFBnet <--> Internet Email Gateway (1:282/1045) --------------- FIDO MESSAGE AREA==> TOPIC: 233 NFB BLIND NEWS Ref: EBY00020Date: 07/28/97 From: JULIE DAWSON Time: 11:00am \/To: ALL (Read 0 times) Subj: 19:Equality of Opportunity -- HISTORY.TX11:00:3307/28/97 From: Julie Dawson Subject: Equality of Opportunity -- HISTORY.TXT (fwd) actions available to remedy discrimination. S. 2345 included both administrative and civil remedies. It granted administrative agencies the authority to order all appropriate remedial relief and gave individuals the right to sue in a district court for both injunctive relief and monetary damages, including punitive damages. Drafters of S. 933, however, viewed these remedial provisions as extreme and politically impossible. Therefore they introduced remedies tailored to each title. Only administrative remedies were available for the public accommodations and telecommunications provisions. Private right to action was granted for employment and public services provisions. For employment discrimination, S. 933 also allowed for punitive damages. Building Support for S. 933 Before publicly circulating the final draft of the bill, Silverstein and Osolinik submitted it to a group of individuals in the disability community for their approval. On one occasion, the two staff members were grilled for hours by persons with disabilities who objected to the apparent weakening of the bill. Osolinik tried to explain that the bill could not be passed without the proposed changes. Silverstein emphasized that the new bill remained true to the original principles. Some in the disability community, however, were outraged. Lots of people felt let down, said Bonnie O Day about the reactions at the spring, 1989, conference of the National Council on Independent Living (NCIL). Yet most agreed that it was dangerous to include provisions that might endanger the entire bill. Ultimately, the disability community lent its support, persuaded that it was the best that could be achieved politically. This was crucial, for a competing Republican bill might polarize the debate and kill the ADA; unity behind S. 933 made it difficult for an alternative proposal to gain a foothold. After the disability community backed S.933, the next task for ADA supporters was to enlist the cosponsorship of members of Congress and the endorsement of President Bush. As in 1988, Liz Savage coordinated a cosponsorship drive in conjunction with House and Senate sponsors. This time the drive was even more aggressive, and it continued throughout the entire ADA deliberations. At the same time, Justin Dart, Marilyn Golden, and others throughout the disability community continued to mobilize the national grass roots network. Persons with disabilities began writing letters urging their representatives to support the ADA. On the Senate side, ADA advocates were especially interested in enlisting the support of Senators Orrin G. Hatch (R-UT) and Robert Dole (R-KS). Hatch s support was extremely impor tant because he was the ranking Republican on the Labor and Human Resources Committee, and the rest of the committee Republicans generally followed his lead in disability policy. In December, 1988, Senator Harkin began meeting with Hatch personally, in addition to consultations between their staffs. Harkin had hoped that Hatch s long and solid record of supporting persons with disabilities would lead to his endorsement of the bill as chief cosponsor. As with Senators Kennedy and Harkin, Hatch had personal experience with disability through his brother, who lost the use of his legs from polio. Hatch, however, had serious reservations about the bill. For example, he proposed more limited remedies and the exemption of religious groups from the public accommoda tions provisions. He also wanted to coordinate his position with the White House. As a result, he declined Harkin s invitation to be the lead cosponsor. Senator Dole s support was crucial because, as Minority Leader, he could wield considerable influence over the progress of the ADA through Senate committees and on the Senate floor.Instead, Senator Hatch directed his chief counsel, Mark Disler, to draft an alternative bill. Disler had worked for Bradford Reynolds in the attorney general s office during the Reagan administration. During the battles over President Reagan s Task Force on Regulatory Relief, Disler had formed good working relationships with Kemp and Wright and become much more knowl edgeable about disability, which helped smooth working with Senator Hatch s staff. The bill Disler crafted was similar to S. 2345 in that it was short and focused on general principles of nondiscrimination. Rather than propose strong, detailed requirements as in S. 933, it gave execu tive agencies the responsibility and authority to create nondiscrimination standards. Senator Hatch s actions were, nonetheless, ultimately designed to aid in the ADA s passage. A quick endorsement of the Harkin bill might have alienated other Republicans, whose support was necessary for effective implementation. Senator Dave Durenberger (R-MN), whose advocacy for people with disabilities stretched back to his tenure as chief of staff for the Governor of Minnesota in the 1960s, explained that Hatch in effect had to stay off of the original bill in order to leverage Republican support for the final product. By drafting his own bill, Hatch paved the way for achieving a broader base of consensus and helped prevent filibustering on the Senate floor. Senator Dole s support was also crucial because, as Minority Leader, he had the power to wield considerable influence over the progress of the ADA through Senate committees and on the Senate floor. For example, he could discourage his party from requesting that the ADA be referred to multiple committees, which could delay or even kill the bill. He could also help prevent damag ing amendments from being introduced on the floor. Similar to Senator Hatch, Dole had a solid record on disability issues. He knew disability first-hand from the paralysis he incurred in World War II. On each anniversary of his injury, April 14, he gave a speech about disability on the Senate floor. In fact, he devoted his first official speech in the Senate, on April 14, 1969, to the needs of the disability community. It is a minority group whose existence affects every person in our society and the very fiber of our Nation, said Dole. He noted that people with disabilities faced significant problems with employment, income, health care, education, rehabilitation, transporta tion, and access to public accommodations. Accordingly, he urged Congress to promote collabora tion between the public and private sectors to improve opportunities for persons with disabilities. He asserted his commitment to make wise use of financial resources, but he wanted to do what was necessary to achieve for people with disabilities the independence, security, and dignity to which they are entitled. Subsequently, in 1984, Dole established the Dole Foundation, which he dedicated to improving the employment prospects of persons with disabilities. Nevertheless, Senator Dole had reservations about the ADA. In part, he was ambivalent because he had talked with Senator Charles E. Grassley (R-IA), Senator Harkin s fellow senator from Iowa about introducing his own bill. Dole, however, received a flood of phone calls from the disability community urging him to cosponsor Harkin s bill and abstain from introducing a competing bill. Crucial in shaping Dole s position on the ADA and encouraging him to support it was one of his staff members, Maureen West. Paul Hearne, Executive Director of NCD and a long-time associate of Dole, assisted West in educating the senator about the ADA. Dole refrained from introducing his own bill. But he also continued to withhold his support of S. 933, even though he was one of fourteen original cosponsors of S. 2345. In addition to Senators Hatch and Dole, ADA supporters were interested in enlisting the support of President Bush and his administration. President Bush had already spoken strongly on behalf of civil rights legislation for people with disabilities on multiple occasions. And Senators Harkin and Kennedy had consulted with the administration throughout the winter and spring of 1989 for input on the development of S. 933. Sometimes these conversations were held person-to- person; at other times they were mediated by members of the disability community, such as Pat Wright and Justin Dart, who had very strong White House connections. The main goal, however, was to encourage the Bush administration take a further step and endorse the version of the ADA developed by Senators Harkin and Kennedy. Faced with the demands of forming an administration and lacking adequate technical disability expertise, however, the White House did not develop a firm position on the bill. Harkin was actually ready to introduce S. 933 in March, but he delayed its introduction at the request of the administration. By April, ADA supporters decided they simply had to move forward with the bill, with or without President Bush. Accordingly, Senator Harkin scheduled the introduction of S. 933 for May 9, 1989, at which time Congressman Coelho would also introduce the companion bill, H.R. 2273. Although ADA supporters were unsuccessful in securing the cosponsorship of Hatch and Dole and the endorsement of Bush, the congressional cosponsorship drive was effective. By May 9, the bill had acquired 33 Senate cosponsors and 84 House cosponsors. In consultation with Congressman Coelho, Senators Kennedy and Harkin developed a strategy for maneuvering the ADA through Congress. They decided to begin the ADA deliberations in the Senate. The Senate would be more manageable because of its rules for legislative delibera tions. Whereas in the House a bill went to all committees with partial jurisdiction, in the Senate a bill went only to one committee, whichever had the preponderance of jurisdiction (subsequent referrals to additional committees could be requested). Moreover, Kennedy and Harkin were chairmen of the committee and subcommittee with jurisdiction. Kennedy s Committee on Labor and Human Resources also had a comfortable Democratic majority. And the ranking Republicans of both the committee and subcommittee Senators Orrin Hatch and Dave Durenberger were strong supporters of disability policy. Furthermore, the Senate had a better working relationship with the administration. Given the importance of bringing the administration on board, it was wise to tailor strategy to its interests. Senators Harkin and Kennedy hoped to push the ADA through the Senate as rapidly as possible with minimal alterations. They feared that lengthy deliberations would increase the chance of losing control of how the ADA was characterized in public debate. Kennedy thus proposed going to mark-up before the Fourth of July recess and to the Senate floor before the August recess. The House would then proceed with the version passed by the Senate, which would help limit the discrepancy between House and Senate versions and smooth conference deliberations. Senate sponsors scheduled three hearings for May 9, 10, and 16; they devoted April to preparing for them. (See Appendix D for a chronology of legislative action on the ADA.) They hoped to prevent any surprises by getting the facts in order and crafting responses to anticipated opposition. Silverstein turned to those who knew disability the best: members of the disability community. He developed a list of about 100 questions and asked representatives of the disability community to explain, based on their experiences at the local level, how various covered entities would respond to ADA provisions. Osolinik and Silverstein then prepared thick briefing books based on the responses. They also worked with the disability community to select witnesses to testify on each aspect of the bill. Unlike the hearings of 1988, the 1989 Senate hearings would include very detailed, technical analyses of the ADA, with a balance of testimony from those who supported the legislation outright and those who promoted changes. Accordingly, the business community and other covered entities were gearing up for the hearings and working with Senate leaders to identify effective witnesses. On May 5, for example, just before the bill s introduction, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce sponsored the first of several meetings for all business organiza tions to discuss their strategy for the ADA, which culminated in their testimony before Congress. Subsequently, a group of business organizations formed a coalition called the Disability Rights Working Group. Senate Hearings and the Quest for Bipartisanship Senate Hearings on S. 933 began in the Dirksen Senate Office Building on Tuesday morning, May 9, 1989. Ranking minority member Senator Hatch set the stage for the hearings in his opening statement. I support a comprehensive civil rights bill for persons with disabilities, Hatch declared unambiguously. But he also stated he had serious concerns. Hatch challenged the extension of public accommodations provisions beyond those establishments covered under the Civil Rights Act of 1964. He promoted an exemption for small businesses. He also opposed provisions for remedies that included monetary and punitive damages. Moreover, Hatch stated that his reservations concerning S.933 might compel him to introduce his own bill, or support a different bill, presumably one introduced by Senator Dole. We can be productive, if you will give us that right, give us that opportunity. That is all we ask for, nothing more, but definitely nothing less. Congressman Tony CoelhoTraditionally the administration offers the lead testimony on major bills, but by May 9 the Bush administration had still not developed a formal position. In fact, the White House had to cancel a May 1 Rose Garden press conference with Senate leadership, which had been designed to promote the ADA. Consequently, Congressman Coelho was the lead witness. He was selected to open the deliberations not only because he was the sponsor of the identical ADA bill introduced in the House; he also poignantly symbolized the ADA. In his senior year of college, Coelho learned he had epilepsy reputed by some to be demonic pos session. As a result, he was barred from the Catholic priesthood and his familial relationships were severely strained. I was suicidal and I was down, Coelho said of his experience with discrimination. But Bob Hope took him into his own home and encouraged him to pursue his ministry through pub lic service. Congressman Coelho met with considerable success after following Hope s advice and beginning a government career. Elected to Congress in 1978, he became Chairman of the Demo cratic Congressional Campaign committee in 1981. Five years later, he was elected Majority Whip. He also became a national leader in disability issues, which included service as Director --- * Origin: NFBnet <--> Internet Email Gateway (1:282/1045) --------------- FIDO MESSAGE AREA==> TOPIC: 233 NFB BLIND NEWS Ref: EBY00021Date: 07/28/97 From: JULIE DAWSON Time: 11:00am \/To: ALL (Read 0 times) Subj: 20:Equality of Opportunity -- HISTORY.TX11:00:3307/28/97 From: Julie Dawson Subject: Equality of Opportunity -- HISTORY.TXT (fwd) of the Epilepsy Foundation of America (EFA). Coelho therefore spoke not only with the authority be stowed upon him from the Democratic leadership, but also as an example of the potential of persons with disabilities. Tony was sort of the epitome of what a person with a disability can do, said Dornatt of his staff, and what they can achieve given a fair shake and given a chance. Coelho echoed this theme in his remarks at the Senate hearing: We can be productive, if you will give us that right, give us that opportunity. That is all we ask for, nothing more, but definitely nothing less. In addition to speaking about his personal experiences, Congressman Coelho addressed Senator Hatch s remarks and stressed the need for bipartisanship: We very much want you on board and very much need your support, he entreated. We would prefer that you not introduce your own bill, he added, urging Hatch to work toward a common bill instead. Hatch replied by pledging his best efforts to develop consensus. I would love nothing better than to cosponsor this bill, Hatch said. But in its present form, I cannot. Only minutes into the first hearing, it was clear that considerable work lay ahead to achieve bipartisanship and shepherd the ADA through Congress. The prospect of a competing bill made cooperation much more critical. The hearings were an opportunity to find a solution. As in 1988, persons with disabilities presented powerful testimony about the need for the ADA by describing their personal experiences. There is not one disabled American alive today who has not experienced some form of discrimination, I. King Jordan said. The most vivid imagery came from Justin Dart. In addition to his carefully crafted and eloquent words, Dart brought visual aids. He presented the committee with a box of discrimination diaries and letters that he and others had gathered from around the country (see Appendix E). Yet, Dart acknowledged, no document could truly demonstrate the impact of discrimination. As a supplement, Dart thus brought an extra wheelchair. I submit to you this brand new empty wheelchair, he said to the committee chairman forcefully. On January 24, 1988, last year, my younger brother, Peter, was faced with the necessity to use, [and] be identified with, this public invitation to discrimination. But his brother claimed: I would rather be dead. Four days later, said Dart, he committed suicide. Others described specific examples of discrimination. Mary DeSapid described being fired by her employer because of her cancer treatment. Amy Dimsdale, a wheelchair-user trained in journalism at the University of Texas at Arlington, described her experiences of being overlooked by potential employers. I have submitted over 300 resumes and more than 100 applications. I have indicated my willingness to be flexible, work at home, relocate, and use my own special equipment all to no avail. I need virtually no special accommodations to work, as long as I can get in the Discrimination destroys healthy self-concepts, and it slowly erodes the human spirit. I. King Jordanbuilding. Lisa Carl, whose cerebral palsy impeded her speech and required use of a wheelchair, spoke about a time when she went to see a movie at a theater around the corner from her house. But Lisa was told she could not enter. Later the theater explained to Lisa s mother: I basically don t have to let her in here, and I don t want her in here. Betty Corey, who took into her home a girl born with AIDS, described having to contact twenty-six different funeral directors before she could find one who would bury the six-year-old without adding surcharges for handling a person with AIDS. Yet, in none of these situations had a law been broken: there was no protec tion such as that provided for minorities and women. Disability advocates used numerous arguments to justify the ADA. Many emphasized the loss of human dignity experienced from discrimination. Dimsdale, for example, said she felt useless, powerless, and demeaned by her inability to get a job. Discrimination destroys healthy self-concepts, and it slowly erodes the human spirit, said Jordan. Others argued that discrimination against the disabled violated one of America s central tenets: individualism. Dart explained that he addressed the committee as a fiscal conservative, an active Republican, and, above all, an advocate for the principles of individual responsibility, individual productivity, and individual rights which have made America great. Social barriers to persons with disabilities, he asserted, under mined an individual s opportunity to participate in American society fully and equally. Others argued that it was more costly to keep persons with disabilities dependent on government assistance than it was to spend the small amount needed to break down barriers and enable people to support themselves. Senator Harkin, for example, hypothesized that the cost to institutionalize one of his constituents with a developmental disability would cost nearly five million dollars over 65 years. Another argument on behalf of the ADA was simply that it was nothing new, nothing radical. These standards are not new, they are not confusing, and they are workable, Arlene Mayerson of the Disability rights Education and Defense Fund (DREDF) declared in reference to the ADA s foundation in Section 504. We tried very hard to avoid any kind of new language, Senator Harkin explained. Although transportation was the most controversial aspect of the ADA, many defended it as the linchpin to the entire bill. The freedom to go to college does not exist without the means to get to the college, testified Michael McIntyre, Executive Director of Queens Independent Living Center. The freedom to work does not exist without the ability to get to work. The freedom to organize politically does not exist without people being able to get together in one place. The freedom to date, to go to the movies, to go to the library, to go shopping, to go to a ball game, [to go] anyplace that makes life meaningful, is predicated on the ability to travel. ADA supporters also emphasized the need to develop solid enforcement provisions to make the bill have a practical effect. The whole trick is to make it more expensive to break the law than it is to keep the law, testified Neil Hartigan, the Attorney General of Illinois. It won t work without damages. Although testimony also came from those proposing changes to the bill, virtually every witness pledged support of the overall ADA concept. The Chamber of Commerce, for example, testified that the chamber shares the goal of the sponsors of this act, and pledged to cooperate in trying to achieve a workable piece of legislation that we can fully support. Similarly, the National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) endorsed the right of every American to have the opportunity to realize his or her full potential. These sentiments were manifested in the name of the business community s coalition: the Disability Rights Working Group. The two dominant reservations about the ADA were cost and litigation. Cost was an issue because the ADA, unlike other civil rights legislation, required businesses and employers to spend money on accommodations and modifications. The second main concern was that, as Lawrence Lorber testified, the litigation potential of this bill is enormous. This fear built on the perception that phrases such as reasonable accommodation, undue hardship, readily achievable, essential function, and less effective were inadequately defined, compelling courts to decide the meaning of the ADA. It also stemmed from the belief that the remedies available under the ADA would invite frivolous law suits. Specific concerns included objections to the public accommodations provisions. William Ball, representing the Association of Christian Schools International, argued that religious organizations and religious schools should be exempt from the public accommodations provisions. The ADA, he argued, would be too costly, might force schools to hire drug/alcohol abusers or homosexuals, and threatened the constitutional separation of church and state. The small business community also argued for an exemption from public accommodations provisions, because of the associated costs and because small business owners were exempt from other civil rights laws. Careful preparations by Senators Harkin and Kennedy, their staffs, and the disability commu nity paid off in the course of the hearings. Harkin, presiding over the deliberations, was especially deft in handling one of the most controversial issues: mandatory lifts for intercity buses (called over-the-road buses because their passengers ride above luggage compartments). In a dialogue with Charles Webb of the American Bus Association (ABA), Harkin creatively used Webb s testimony to defend the ADA. Webb testified that a bus lift cost $35,000, required annual mainte nance of $2,000, and resulted in a 38 percent loss in luggage space and a loss of 11 or 12 seats. Harkin, however, asked Webb whether a technologically-advanced lift that cost less than $8,000, required little or no maintenance, and resulted in no loss of package space and only one seat, would be acceptable. Absolutely, Webb replied. Well, now, I am glad to hear you say that, said Harkin with pride, because I have a letter here from the Regional Transportation District of Denver, Colorado, which has secured a contract for a lift with exactly those specifications. To the applause of those assembled, Senator Harkin went on to explain that competition and technology would only drive the price further down when lifts were ordered by the thousands. In addition to their compelling testimony, the Senate hearings were significant for the dialogue concerning bipartisanship and the Bush administration, which was carried out between Senators Kennedy and Harkin, on the one hand, and Senators Dole and Hatch, on the other. On May 10, under relentless pressure from the disability community, Dole made an appearance before the Senate committee to make a statement. On the previous Friday, May 5, he had met with President Bush s chief counsel C. Boyden Gray, Chief of Staff John Sununu, head of the Domestic Policy Council Roger Porter, and others in the White House, to discuss how they could cooperate in working out a bipartisan bill. Dole had also spoken with President Bush on May 9. Before the committee, Dole now asserted that he and the administration hoped to see, before year s end, a bipartisan piece of legislation passed by Congress, signed by the president, and embraced by, hopefully, the business community and certainly by the disability community. He was somewhat cautious, however, because he wanted a bill that all affected parties could defend. He feared the potential for litigation and promoted a gradual phase-in to protect small businesses. Nevertheless, he wanted to be a positive force rather than an obstructionist, and urged that the administration needed more time to formulate its position on the bill. The disability community, however, was growing impatient. NCIL held its annual conference in Washington, D.C., from May 12 to May 14. At the conference, Bonnie O Day, Chairperson of the NCIL Civil Rights Subcommittee, met with Pat Wright and Liz Savage, whereupon they talked about organizing NCIL conferees to hold a rally at the White House to demand swift action on the ADA. In short order, O Day and others from NCIL began planning a march for Sunday, May 14 Mother s Day. Committees formed to make signs and work out such details as getting a police permit. They planned to march from NCIL s reception on Capitol Hill to the White House. Several hundred people, including local ADA supporters, joined the march. They left in the evening amidst pouring rain, carrying candles. People using wheelchairs covered themselves with garbage bags, a symbol of their second-class-citizen status. Boyden Gray is the most powerful counsel to a president we ve had in a long, long time. . . . On the issues Boyden has chosen, he is awfully damned influential. A.B. Culvahouse At the White House, Marca Bristo, President of NCIL, approached the security desk to place a call to President Bush. Al though she intended only to mobilize and rally the crowd, an operator actually answered the phone and placed a call through to the Domes tic Policy Office. Subsequently, Bristo told a White House representative that she and others were out in the rain, were concerned about the ADA, and wanted to see the president. In reply, the representative offered Bristo a meeting with White House staff the following morning. The next day, Bristo, Dart, and several other representatives from the disability community met with Dr. William L. Roper, of the Domestic Policy Counsel, Chief Counsel Boyden Gray, and EEOC Chairman Evan Kemp to complain about the president s delays. Although the discussion did not result in a specific commitment, the disability representa tives came away feeling as if they had gotten their message through to the administration. Two days later, at the final scheduled hearing on May 16, the NCIL march appeared to have had an effect. Having consulted with the White House, Senator Hatch said that it was imperative that this committee hear testimony from the administration on this bill. Accordingly, he requested that the committee give the administration one more chance. Hatch proposed that the committee delay mark-up for five weeks, hold one additional hearing during the week of June 19, and invite the administration to come forward. If it did not, Hatch pledged that he would not stand in the way of the bill. Although the administration had already possessed a draft of the bill for nearly two months, Senator Kennedy agreed to grant more time, stipulating that if it did not come forward, the committee would move on without its input. White House Testimony President Bush wanted the ADA done in a way that was good for the American people . . . this was not going to be a shell promise. Dr. William Roper During the next five weeks, executive agencies reviewed the bill to make recommendations for an administration position. Unlike Congress, which follows a fairly organized deliberative process to reconcile the views of two parties, policy-making in the White House is an ongoing internal dynamic. It organizes its decision-making according to a series of functions, which are administered by such advisory boards as the National Security Council, the Domestic Policy Council, the Office of Counsel, and the Office of Personnel. --- * Origin: NFBnet <--> Internet Email Gateway (1:282/1045) --------------- FIDO MESSAGE AREA==> TOPIC: 233 NFB BLIND NEWS Ref: EBY00022Date: 07/28/97 From: JULIE DAWSON Time: 11:00am \/To: ALL (Read 0 times) Subj: 21:Equality of Opportunity -- HISTORY.TX11:00:3307/28/97 From: Julie Dawson Subject: Equality of Opportunity -- HISTORY.TXT (fwd) These groups, which are composed of cabinet members and staff, theoretically report to the Chief of Staff, who coordinates decisions with the president. Although a presidential adminis tration is generally comprised of officials from one political party, conflicts over specific poli cies abound. Technically, White House policy regarding the ADA fell under the purview of the Domestic Policy Council, which was chaired by Roger Porter and included the attorney general, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and the Secretary of Transportation. The key to the ADA in the White House, however, was Chief Counsel C. Boyden Gray. There is no formal job description for the White House Chief Counsel. Rather, responsibilities are tailored by each individual president. Gray had served as Bush s counsel for eight years during the Reagan adminis tration. They became close friends and shared similar family backgrounds: their fathers were golf partners. Their relationship gave Gray considerable influence. Boyden is the most powerful counsel to a president we ve had in a long, long time, said Gray s immediate predecessor during the Reagan administration, A.B. Culvahouse. Gray was selective in the issues which he engaged. But on the issues Boyden has chosen, said Culvahouse, he is awfully damned influential. And, based on his friendship with Evan Kemp and following his experience with President Reagan s Task Force on Regulatory Relief, Gray took a keen interest in the ADA. White House action on the ADA was framed by President Bush s declarations in support of disability rights legislation. This was a relatively unique interest for Bush, as he was best known and respected for his expertise on, and passion for, foreign policy. The question, said Dr. William Roper, who worked for Porter on the Domestic Policy Council, was precisely how Bush s commitments would be translated into specific policy. There were discussions about the extent to which the administration would abide by the campaign promise. But Bush was steadfast in his commitment to getting a solid act passed. He wanted it done in a way that was good for the American people, said Roper: this was not going to be a shell promise. Others inside the White House were much less enamored with the ADA, and had substantive reservations. Civil rights was a charged issue in the Bush administration. Kemp explained that the White House would not entertain any concept of quotas with regard to the ADA. Officials within the Bush administration emphasized that people with disabilities needed to be qualified for any given job, that the original ADA definition needed to be limited, and that there needed to be a sensible limit to the responsibility of providing reasonable accommodations. If these fundamental issues were settled, said Kemp, the White House could move forward with shaping the details. As White House consultant Robert Funk explained, Funk, Gray, and others reminded skeptics of Bush s promise. In addition to Gray, Attorney General Richard Thornburgh was a crucial advocate of the ADA and Bush s aspirations. So was Kemp, who functioned as a vital link between the disability community and the White House. Thornburgh s testimony was crucial: it demonstrated that the White House was willing to work toward consensus on a bill that President Bush could endorse.The Department of Justice (DOJ) organized the various recommendations made by executive agencies, and Attorney General Thornburgh became the point person to represent the administration. Thornburgh, as many others, had personal experience with disability. His son, Peter, had acquired a learning disability from an automobile accident. As parents, Thornburgh and his wife Ginny had moved from caring for the special needs of their own son to working for others with similar conditions. In Pennsylvania, Mrs. Thornburgh had served as county chairperson of the ARC and was a member of Presi dent Reagan s Committee on Mental Retardation. Her work influenced her husband, who used his au thority as Governor of Pennsylvania to assist persons with disabilities. At the Senate hearing on June 22, 1989, it was clear that those in support of the ADA within the White House prevailed in shaping the administration s position, which was presented by Attorney General Thornburgh. We at the Department of Justice, Thornburgh said, wholeheartedly share [the ADA s] goals and commit ourselves, along with the president and the rest of his administration, to a bipartisan effort to enact comprehensive legislation attacking discrimination in employment, public services, transportation, public accommodations, and telecommunications. He explained that granting civil rights to disabled persons would help the American economy by promoting employ ment instead of dependence. Moreover, Thornburgh declared the administration s support of every basic principle, as well as to the overall principle of linking the bill to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. He also identified areas of concern: drug-abusers should not be covered by the definition of disability; measures should be taken to ameliorate the burden on small businesses; the extension of public accommodations beyond the Civil Rights Act should be carefully analyzed; attempts should be made to minimize litigation; the Secretary of Transportation should be able to grant exemptions to transit systems; and the most cost-effective and efficient system of telecommunications should be pursued. Most significantly, however, Thornburgh pledged to begin working, both at the staff and principal levels, to work toward bipartisan consensus on the ADA. Although there were pronounced differences between ADA sponsors and the Bush adminis tration, Senator Harkin responded to Attorney General Thornburgh by emphasizing all the areas of agreement. Accordingly, a Washington Post headline declared: Thornburgh Endorses Civil Rights Protection for the Disabled. This statement masked deep divisions, but it effectively identified the ADA s advances and potential. Attorney General Thornburgh s testimony was crucial because it demonstrated that the Bush administration was willing to work toward consensus on a bill that President Bush could endorse. Senators Harkin and Kennedy eagerly accepted the invitation to open negotiations with the Bush administration. And, as a result of Thornburgh s testimony, Senators Dole and Hatch laid to rest the possibilities of introducing competing bills. The ADA, sweeping in its provisions, emerged from the hearings with virtually every witness supporting the concept of the bill. Every argument against the ADA met with an effective rebuttal. The ADA was sound and it was on the move. Negotiations Between the Senate and the White House Although Senator Harkin was the Senate sponsor, Senator Kennedy the full committee Chair and a senior Senator took the lead in negotiating with the White House. Kennedy s plan of attack was to get all parties into the same room and essentially stay there until all issues were resolved. These discussions would include the administration, the Senate, the House, and both the business and disability communities. House Republicans, however, declined to participate, for they did not want to be bound by any agreements. Moreover, the White House insisted that only representatives of Congress and the administration could join the negotiations. Kennedy and Harkin wanted disability representatives to be at the table because they had so much technical expertise, but they and all other outside constituencies were not allowed into the negotiating room. Thus, only representatives from the Senate and the Bush administration came to the table. The first meeting took place about a week after Attorney General Thornburgh s testimony in the anteroom of the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources. Roper was the lead negotiator for the administration. He worked especially closely with Robert Funk, a co-founder of DREDF and a disability advocate from the Domestic Policy Council. Osolinik and Silverstein were the leaders for the Senate. At the outset of the meeting, in light of the absence of House Republi cans as participants, Osolinik insisted on two main ground rules. First, she emphasized that they needed to come up with a complete settlement: leaving any issue unresolved might undercut the agreements that were made. Second, she argued that the administration had to stand by the negoti ated agreements, even if House Republicans later opposed them and looked for administration support. Roper, however, said he could not commit to these stipulations because he had not cleared them with his superior, Chief of Staff Sununu. Osolinik promptly called off the meeting and said she was ready to continue whenever the administration was willing to agree to the conditions. Such actions led Wright to claim that Osolinik was one of the toughest negotiators I have ever seen. Over the Fourth of July weekend, Chief of Staff Sununu telephoned Senator Kennedy to talk about the abruptly-ended meeting. Kennedy repeated the two ground rules submitted by Osolinik, and Sununu agreed to abide by them. Accordingly they made plans to resume negotiations on July 6, 1989, and settled on the times, participants, and location. Over the next two weeks, through July 18, Senate staff and administration staff held ten negotiation sessions. From the Senate, the principal participants were the staffs of Senators Kennedy, Harkin, Hatch, Durenberger, and Dole. Staff from the office of Senator John McCain (R-AZ) joined the discussion regarding telecommuni cations provisions and were pivotal in shaping that portion of the bill. For the administration, participants came primarily from the White House, including Roper and Funk; the Justice Depart ment, especially the author of the Section 504 regulations, John Wodatch; the Department of Transportation; and OMB. Although non-governmental constituencies were not allowed in the Senate anteroom, they waited in a nearby conference room where they could be consulted during breaks. Those present in the meetings devoted several hours to each session, went through the bill line by line, and identified scores of disagreements for discussion. The staffs reached agreement on the vast majority of issues, but a few unresolvable disputes were left for the principals. These more difficult issues included the scope of remedies (namely the inclusion of compensatory and punitive damages), the scope of public accommodations (namely whether the ADA applied to more establishments than those covered by the Civil Rights Act), exemption of religious groups from the public accommodations provisions, the definition of disability, and coverage of drug and alcohol users. On July 28, ten days after the conclusion of negotiation sessions, Senator Dole sponsored a principals meeting in his conference room. They met there because of the ample space and because the office of the Minority Leader was friendlier terrain for the administration. Those present included Senators Kennedy, Harkin, Dole, Hatch, and Durenberger, Chief Counsel Gray, Chief of Staff Sununu, Secretary of Transportation Samuel K. Skinner, Attorney General Thornburgh, head of the Domestic Policy Counsel Roger Porter, and others representing executive agencies covered by the ADA. The purpose of the meeting was to hammer out agreements on remaining issues. But at one point Sununu lost his temper and began yelling at Silverstein. Kennedy slammed his hand on the table, yelled back that he would not stand for shouting at Senate staff, and threatened to walk out. The discussion resumed, but no official agreements were made: the meeting was cut short. Three days later, on July 31, Senators Kennedy and Harkin and Attorney General Thorn burgh resolved the handful of remaining issues and closed the negotiations. The breakthrough compromise, which facilitated agreement on other issues, was essentially a swap concerning public accommodations and remedies. In the area of public accommodations, the administration had used the parity principle against ADA sponsors by arguing that the ADA should cover only those establishments covered under the Civil Rights Act. With respect to remedies, the administration wanted to exclude compensatory and punitive damages. As a compromise, Kennedy and Harkin agreed to restrict remedies to the standards of the Civil Rights Act in exchange for the adminis tration s consent to apply the ADA to the broad spectrum of public accommodations. There were several other major agreements included in what Senator Kennedy termed a The breakthrough compromise, which facilitated agreement on other issues, was essentially a swap concerning public accommodations and remedies. fragile compromise. First, with respect to employment, negotiators incorporated a two-year delay of the effective date for operations with 25 or more employees, and a four-year delay for operations with 15 to 24 employees. Establishments with fewer than 15 employees were already exempted from the employment title. They also introduced stronger language to ensure that current employees who abused drugs and alcohol would not be a protected class. Second, concerning public transportation, the agreement included authority for the Secretary of Transportation to waive the requirement of bus lifts for fixed-route systems when lifts were unavailable. For private intercity bus transportation, the agreement delayed implementa tion of lift requirements for at least five years and mandated a study to explore how best to make intercity buses accessible. Third, regarding public accommodations, the negotiated agreement delayed implementation for 18 months, exempted religious organizations and private clubs, and specified that elevators were required only in buildings with at least three stories or more than 3,000 square feet per floor. Senate Approval After reaching a final agreement with Attorney General Thornburgh on July 31, 1989, Senators Kennedy and Harkin continued to push the ADA forward, scheduling the Labor and Human Resources committee mark-up for August 2. This gave Senate staff only a couple of days to translate every agreement into appropriate legislative language. They did not finish writing the substitute bill until about 3:00 in the morning on the day of the mark-up. The committee mark-up itself was rather uneventful it lasted less than an hour. This was mainly because the intense and detailed negotiations had settled most issues. Moreover, committee Democrats and Republicans gave deference to Senators Kennedy and Harkin, and Senators Hatch and Durenberger, --- * Origin: NFBnet <--> Internet Email Gateway (1:282/1045) --------------- FIDO MESSAGE AREA==> TOPIC: 233 NFB BLIND NEWS Ref: EBY00023Date: 07/28/97 From: JULIE DAWSON Time: 11:00am \/To: ALL (Read 0 times) Subj: 22:Equality of Opportunity -- HISTORY.TX11:00:3307/28/97 From: Julie Dawson Subject: Equality of Opportunity -- HISTORY.TXT (fwd) all of whom supported the rewrite of S. 933. Accordingly, the committee voted unanimously, 16 to 0, to report the ADA to the Senate floor for final consideration. The Senate, the Bush administration, and the disability and business communities had truly come a long way since January to achieve unanimous, bipartisan support. It was one of the most extraordinary legislative accomplishments I ve ever seen, said Neas. For the disability community, it was a remarkable victory. Moreover, the compromise empowered President Bush, who had previously supported the principles of the ADA, to endorse a specific version of the bill. The Labor and Human Resources Committee voted unanimously, 16 to 0, to report the ADA to the Senate floor for final consideration a remarkable victory for the disability community.The Senate closed for recess just two days after the mark-up, on August 4. But while many members and their staffs went on vacation, Senators Harkin and Kennedy continued to drive the ADA forward to keep the momentum alive. They wanted to make the ADA one of the first items of business when the Senate resumed on Sep tember 6. This meant that the committee report had to be filed by August 30 in order to give Senators and their staffs ample time to review the issues. For three weeks Democratic and Republican Senate staff worked intensively with the administration, the disability community, and the business community to develop a report that established an accurate historical record reflecting the various negotiated agreements. They completed a draft by August 22, and submitted the report to accompany the substitute version of S. 933 on August 30. The speed with which the Labor and Human Resources Committee moved the ADA shocked many senators and staff members. When the ADA came up for a vote on September 7, just a day after the Senate reopened for the fall, some senators complained that things had happened too quickly, that they did not have enough time to review the legislation. Others opposed the bill outright. Humphrey (R-NH) called it one of the most radical pieces of legislation I have encountered. Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) cynically suggested the bill should be called the Lawyers Relief Act of 1989. For the most part, however, senators applauded the concepts of the ADA. In fact, by September 6 more than 60 senators had signed on as cosponsors. Debate on the Senate floor lasted late into the night, totaling over fourteen hours. Although the fundamentals of the bill were never threatened, several divisive issues emerged. The first was a proposed amendment by Senator Hatch, which would provide a $5,000 tax credit to businesses for making accommodations and modifications an alternative to a complete exemption for small businesses from the public accommodations provisions. Hatch warned that the government was a potentially oppressive institution and said that it was unfair to burden small businesses with the costs of implementation without placing any of the responsibility on the government. Senator Lloyd Bentsen (D-TX), however, argued that the amendment was a killer amendment because all bills affecting revenue are constitutionally required to come from the House. Hatch disagreed with Bentsen, as did a majority of the Senate. But since the Budget Act required a two-thirds majority for such revenue amendments, the tax credit proposal failed. Near the end of the floor debate, shortly before 10:00 p.m., Senator Grassley introduced an amendment that brought Congress under the purview of the ADA. Senator Hatch had raised the issue during the committee mark-up, but Senator Kennedy had cautioned Hatch that the provision might kill the bill if introduced too early. On the Senate floor, Grassley argued that it was unfair for the Senate to impose a burden on the American people without sharing it. Senator Wendell H. Ford (D-KY), however, argued that such an amendment blurred the constitutional balance of powers by giving the executive branch administrative control over Congress. Ford agreed with Senators Harkin and Kennedy that the ADA should apply to Congress. But he thought the issue should be considered more carefully in conference, not passed hastily because people were tired and wanted to go home. Despite his objections, the Senate approved the amendment (by counting the number of Senators standing in favor of and against it) with the supposition that the amendment only articulated intent: details would be worked out in the House or in conference. A much more acrimonious debate centered on the definition of disability. Senator William L. Armstrong (R-CO) argued that the definition of disability in the ADA was too broad. He was especially concerned about the inclusion of mental disorders and disorders with a moral con tent. He questioned whether senators thought homosexuality, bisexuality, exhibitionism, pedo philia, voyeurism, and kleptomania should be protected by the ADA. Senator Jesse Helms shared Armstrong s concerns, especially with respect to homosexuality, and feared that employers would no longer be allowed to maintain moral standards in their businesses. Senator Kennedy, however, argued that prohibiting discrimination against persons with HIV was crucial if the epidemic was to be controlled, because people would otherwise be less likely to reveal their illness. And Senator Pete V. Domenici (R-NM) cautioned against excluding persons with mental illness, noting the recent recognition that such legendaries as Abraham Lincoln and Winston Churchill struggled with bipolar disorder. Although Senators Kennedy and Harkin opposed unduly restricting the definition, it appeared that the bill would not go forward unless specific conditions or impair ments were expressly excluded from the bill. They thus worked with Armstrong and Hatch for hours, in consultation with the disability community, to prepare a list. Senator Hatch typed the amendment himself, and the Senate approved it by a voice vote. If it had become a Democratic bill, we would have lost. . . . It had to be bipartisan. Congressman Tony CoelhoWith these and several other smaller amendments considered and resolved, the Senate finally voted on the ADA. In a remarkable demonstration of bipartisanship, the Senate voted affirmatively by a count of 76 to 8. This bipartisanship was crucial for the ADA s success, because the bill consequently entered the House deliberations as a coali tion bill with the indispensable support of President Bush. Without the negotiations that had culminated in the support of Senators Hatch and Dole and President Bush, the ADA might have been labeled as a partisan initiative. If it had become a Democratic bill, said Congressman Coelho, we would have lost. . . . It had to be bipartisan. The ADA had indeed achieved a broad base of support from both parties, but a difficult battle in the House of Representa tives lay ahead. 5 Fashioning a Durable ADA: The House of Representatives Much more work had to be done to achieve the bipartisan support that ADA advocates sought. Hopes for quick passage were dashed; debate in the House took nearly nine more months.The overwhelming affirmative vote in the Senate contributed to the ADA s remarkable momentum. The intense negotiations with the White House had resulted in a bill that earned President Bush s endorsement, which essentially guaranteed passage of the bill in some form. The Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources had been unanimous in its support of the ADA. A grassroots disability community had made its presence known on Capitol Hill by uniting to advocate aggressively for the ADA. Meanwhile, no considerable opposition had organized. By the time the Senate voted on September 7, 1989, nearly half the House had cosponsored the bill almost enough votes to pass it. These factors led many senators and the Bush administration to anticipate and hope for swift passage in the House before year s end. Other factors, however, pointed to a more challenging process. Whereas 185 Democrats signed on as cosponsors (88 percent of all House signatures), only 25 Republicans attached their names to the bill. Moreover, while House Democrats had worked with the Senate in redrafting the ADA and were kept informed about the negotiations with the administration, House Republicans had kept their distance. They did not contribute substantively to the redrafting process; they also declined from participating in the White House negotiations to avoid being bound by them, and because they wanted to convey that they were trying to look out for [the] needs of the business community. Consequently, though the Senate crafted a breakthrough compromise bill, House deliberations would have to cover the same issues all over again. Much more work had to be done to achieve the bipartisan support that ADA advocates sought. Hopes for quick passage were dashed; debate in the House took nearly nine more months. Early Actions in the House Compared with the Senate, where there were powerful and passionate advocates of disability in leadership positions on both sides of the aisle, Republican and Democratic leadership in the House, with the exception of Majority Whip Tony Coelho (D-CA), were much more cautious. House Speaker James C. Wright, Jr. (D-TX) and Majority Leader Thomas S. Foley (D-WA) were skeptical of the ADA s wide-ranging impact and viewed the bill more as a private agenda of Congressman Coelho than an issue of national policy importance. I had the leadership unwilling to tell me no because it was me, Coelho said. But they were not openly supportive and would have killed the ADA, if it hadn t been [for] my making it so personal. Although in time the ADA would come to be viewed as a leadership bill, largely because of Coelho s status as Majority Whip, the initially weak support of Democratic leadership placed Republicans in a position to shape the ADA to their interests. Congressman Coelho was the first member of the House to join the campaign to pass the ADA. He was the bill s sponsor both in 1988 and in 1989. He also collaborated with Senators Tom Harkin (D-IA) and Edward M. Kennedy (D-MA) to rewrite the ADA and craft a master strategy for passage. House Republicans did not demonstrate significant interest in the ADA until it entered Congress for the second time in the spring of 1989. The leader among Republicans was Congress man Steve Bartlett (R-TX). He had played an integral role in recasting disability policy in terms of independence and in issuing a mandate to the National Council on the Handicapped (NCD) to review federal programs and make recommendations. Although he generally supported the proposals in Toward Independence, Bartlett was cautious about the lead recommendation pertaining to an equal opportunity law. Throughout 1988 he had watched the ADA from a distance. But after President- elect Bush promised support of an act similar to the ADA at a pre-inaugural event on January 19, making passage seem imminent, Bartlett decided to become involved to ensure that it was a reason able bill. In April, 1989, Congressman Bartlett joined with Minority Leader Robert H. Michel (R-IL) and Congressman William F. Goodling (R-PA) to propose a partnership with Congressman Coelho. We would like to work with you to develop a good bipartisan bill, they wrote to Coelho on April 25. By working together, we hope to develop language that we can agree upon, support, and introduce together. But the revised draft was already completed and Bartlett, Michel, and Goodling did not cosponsor the ADA at the time of its introduction. Michel also wrote a letter to President Bush, on April 26, urging him to join in the efforts of working toward a bipartisan bill. Such an effort, Michel said is appropriate, definitely warranted, and most importantly, deserved by individu als with disabilities and others who will be affected by it. Bush fulfilled this request by working with the Senate to develop a compromise bill. Shortly into the House deliberations in the spring of 1989, ADA supporters received a significant blow that paralleled the 1988 defeat of Senator Lowell P. Weicker, Jr. (R-CT). While House Speaker Wright was under scrutiny for alleged ethics violations, some members accused Congressman Coelho of violating House ethical standards by investing in certain bonds. Unlike Wright, however, who dragged out his own investigation before leaving Congress, Coelho promptly submitted his resignation, effective June 15. His commitment to the ADA influenced this decision. Coelho had become a national leader for disability policy. And, though he flatly denied the charges against him, he feared that an investigation might, by association, embarrass the disability commu nity and consequently hurt its prospects for success on the ADA. Although Congressman Coelho s career as a U.S. Representative drew to a close, his advocacy for the ADA did not. According to Ralph Neas, he played a key role, if not a crucial role, on many different occasions with Democrats in the House and the Senate, with Republicans in the House and the Senate, and with President Bush, pushing the calendar on a number of occasions, really helping get us through some difficult times. For example, he took the lead in the House cosponsorship drive and capitalized on his personal attachment to the bill and the trust he had cultivated among colleagues. Moreover, though he was a partisan Democrat, Coelho was well known for his desire to bring opponents to his side by working to empower them with shared ownership and finding common ground, rather than pitch battles. There was always the possibility that having to go through four committees . . . could endanger some of the best and strongest provisions. Ralph Neas Accordingly, Congressman Coelho joined with Democratic Congressman Major R. Owens (D-NY), and Republican Congressmen Silvio O. Conte (R-MA) and Hamilton Fish, Jr. (R-NY), to facilitate cosponsorship. In a letter to the rest of their colleagues on June 1, they emphasized the Republican origins of the bill through NCD and the problem of paying persons with disabilities not to work. Persons with disabilities want to be productive, self-supporting, and tax-paying participants in society, they wrote. This bill will grant them that dignity and that right. Because the ADA was a civil rights bill, ADA supporters anticipated that members would read ily support it. Yet, despite the bipartisan effort, the process of enlisting House cosponsors was slow: the issue of costs caused people to hesitate. Whereas members often cosponsor a bill when certain --- * Origin: NFBnet <--> Internet Email Gateway (1:282/1045) --------------- FIDO MESSAGE AREA==> TOPIC: 233 NFB BLIND NEWS Ref: EBY00024Date: 07/28/97 From: JULIE DAWSON Time: 11:00am \/To: ALL (Read 0 times) Subj: 23:Equality of Opportunity -- HISTORY.TX11:00:3307/28/97 From: Julie Dawson Subject: Equality of Opportunity -- HISTORY.TXT (fwd) colleagues do, in this case they wanted to scrutinize the bill individually. The House cosponsorship drive was less successful than that in the Senate 33 percent of all senators and 19 percent of all representatives were cosponsors on May 9. But Congressman Coelho secured a crucial commitment from Congressman Steny H. Hoyer (D-MD). The two members had become close friends since Coelho, as Chairman of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, had assisted Hoyer in his first campaign. At Coelho s request, Hoyer assumed the role of managing the ADA in the House. This meant organizing committee deliberations, serving as the principal negotiator, and leading floor deliberations. Out of respect for Coelho s commitment to the ADA, Hoyer called himself chief cosponsor, and continued to identify Coelho as the ADA s sponsor. Like so many other members of Congress, the ADA had personal significance for Hoyer: his wife had epilepsy. He became a zealous advocate for the ADA. A Bird s Eye View of the House Deliberations By the time the ADA reached the House committees, the basic goals of the bill had been widely affirmed. Many members, however, viewed the legislative process as an incremental one, whereby major policies would be assembled step by step over many years. Passing the ADA was especially challenging because, as Rochelle Dornatt of Coelho s staff observed, we were creating a whole new set of rights . . . a whole new set of civil rights. The principal focus in the House was not the needs of persons with disabilities, which had already been well-established by the Senate, but, rather, the bill s effect on covered entities. As Melissa Schulman of Congressman Hoyer s office explained: What the House was doing . . . was making the bill more acceptable to business. Coelho often noted that the trick in the legislative process was to find that magic number, that 218, to get the bill passed. With the ADA, advocates were trying to get much more than that, but it required extensive work at the committee level to satisfy members concerned with covered entities in their districts. House consideration of the ADA was different and more complicated than the Senate s for several reasons. First, the committee structure was more complex. In the Senate, the bill went only to one committee and one subcommittee. There it was considered primarily as a civil rights bill and did not undergo the technical scrutiny of the commerce and transportation committees. In the House it went to four committees (Education and Labor, Public Works and Transportation, Energy and Commerce, and Judiciary), and six subcommittees (Select Education; Employment Opportunities; Surface Transportation; Telecommunications and Finance; Transportation, Tourism, and Hazardous Materials; and Civil and Constitutional Rights). In addition, the Committee on Small Business held a non-legislative hearing to generate information that could be used by other committees or during floor deliberations. These multiple committee referrals meant that the ADA would have to withstand the scrutiny of various technical experts, especially with regard to transportation. Moreover, 164 representatives, compared with 16 senators, and many more House staff than Senate staff reviewed the bill in committee. This increased the chance of a committee altering, delaying, or even killing the bill and posed a major challenge to coordinating the deliberative process and keeping the bill intact.. All indications suggested that a bill would pass. But, as Neas explained, there was always the possibility that having to go through four committees . . . could endanger some of the best and strongest provisions. According to Arlene Mayerson, it was an overwhelming strategic nightmare. A second factor also complicated the House deliberations. In the Senate, the chief sponsors of the bill, Senators Kennedy and Harkin, were chairmen of the full committee and subcommittee with jurisdiction. In the House, however, Congressman Hoyer was not even a member of any of the committees reviewing the bill. He was responsible for shepherding . . . the bill through the process, explained Schulman, even though he had to do it without committee authority, relying on forming relationships with chairmen who often guarded their committee jurisdiction jealously. Keeping everything together was a challenging task indeed. But Hoyer rose to the challenge. As Neas said, he put on one of the best legislative shows of all time. One cannot underestimate Hoyer s importance. Unless you have somebody who is going to take responsibility for seeing that it all gets done and there is some cohesion in the process, Schulman said, it never would have happened. Unless you have somebody who is going to take responsibility for seeing that it all gets done and there is some cohesion in the process, it never would have happened. Melissa Schulman Congressman Hoyer and staff member Schulman were central players, if not the leaders, in every aspect of the bill s development in the House cosponsorship, hearings, committee review, negotiations, committee and floor amendments, interactions with the White House, floor delibera tions, conference proceedings, and crisis management. They feared that the committees might signif icantly weaken the bill, and that the disability community might walk out of the process in frustra tion. Hoyer thus committed to meeting with any member who wanted to discuss the bill. He even walked through a Giant Food store with concerned parties to explore the practical impact of the ADA. Schulman remained confident that the bill would pass. But at times, she said, it just looked next to impossible. The legislative process in the House also differed in a third respect: the roles assumed by the business and disability communities and the Bush administration. The ADA went through the Sen ate like a blitzkrieg. This had compelled many business lobbyists essentially to throw in the towel with respect to the Senate and strategically focus their efforts on the House. The disability community, on the other hand, had been very much on the offensive throughout the Senate delibera tions, seeking to persuade senators and the Bush administration to support its goals for an accessible America. Although many compromises had to be made to achieve presidential and Senate support, the disability community had been generally satisfied with an ADA that emerged from the Senate. And with respect to the Bush administration, it had been an active participant in hammering out a compromise bill that could win the endorsement of President Bush, which Bush granted on August 2, 1989. Persons with disabilities were now more on the defensive. Their chief goal was to hold as much ground as possible, amidst an onslaught of proposed revisions.The circumstances were much different in the House. While business groups worked extensively with the Senate and the Bush ad ministration in developing a compromise bill, activity was primarily in Washington: there were only limited efforts to apply pressure on members from their constituents at home. But, during House deliberations, the business community vigorously lobbied the House by mobilizing constituent pressure. By the time the ADA reached the House, Mayerson said, the National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) was distributing millions of flyers to every business across the country. Moreover, because of President Bush s endorsement of the ADA, outright opposition was futile and apathy was dangerous. Barring an unexpected calamity, the bill was going to pass, at least in some form. If businesses wanted their voice to make a difference and meet some of their objectives, they had to support the overall concept of the bill. Persons with disabilities, on the other hand, were now more on the defensive. Their chief goal was to hold as much ground as possible amidst an onslaught of proposed revisions. The disability community continually reminded opponents that a Republican president backed the ADA. Indeed, President Bush was a strong advocate of the ADA and had been in the forefront of promoting civil rights legislation for people with disabilities. By endorsing the negoti ated version of the ADA on August 2, 1989, President Bush set the stage for the House deliberations, where passage consequently seemed imminent. Attorney General Richard Thornburgh most actively articulated the Bush administration s support. For example, on September 19, Thornburgh wrote a powerful letter to the editor of the New York Times on behalf of the ADA. He underscored his and the president s support of the ADA. In particular, he challenged the errors of a Times article for example, its allegation that there had been surprisingly narrow public scrutiny of the ADA. Thornburgh described how the Bush administration, the Senate, and interested parties had entered painstaking negotiations that resulted in a carefully balanced measure. On October 12, Attorney General Thornburgh testified on behalf of the administration, before the House Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights and gave a ringing endorsement of the ADA. He noted that many people with disabilities continue to live in an intolerable state of isolation and dependence and argued that the ADA could be the vehicle that brings persons with disabilities into the mainstream of American life. It was a historic opportunity, he said, to have the chance to help move the ADA through Congress. Thornburgh s testimony was important because it demonstrated the Bush administration s continued support of the ADA and reflected President Bush s desire to see the ADA passed quickly. For the most part, however, compared with its intense and consistent interaction with the Senate, the Bush administration participated in the House deliberations only intermittently. Proponents of the ADA widely assumed that the administration stayed in the background because the administration was willing to let the House modify the bill and perhaps implement proposals the administration had been unable to negotiate with the Senate. House Republicans, for their part, preferred that the White House let them have the freedom to conduct their own analysis and revisions of the bill. House Democrats wanted the administration to speak out more authoritatively on behalf of the negotiated ADA, but they would settle for not having the administration advocate any weakening amendments. President Bush satisfied all parties by remaining outside the fray. The House deliberations were also characterized by ideological distinctions. ADA supporters widely hailed the bill as bipartisan legislation. Indeed, in the final analysis the ADA received overwhelming support from both parties 93 percent of the vote in each chamber and at least 86 percent of the vote in each party. There were also key advocates on both sides of the aisle, especially in the Senate, where Senators Harkin, Kennedy, Orrin G. Hatch (R-UT), Dave Durenberger (R-MN), and Robert Dole (R-KS) were deeply committed to the ADA. Moreover, Republicans and Democrats found common ground: they agreed that it was a bad idea to pay people not to work, to stay home. Nevertheless, an ideological fault line emerged between the interests of the business and disability communities. Republicans tended to vote in favor of easing the demands imposed on business. This became evident during the Senate floor deliberations. For example, Senator Hatch s amendment to include a tax credit for businesses (the only vote to be recorded) split along party lines. Whereas 71 percent of Republicans supported the amendment, 64 percent of Democrats opposed it. In the House, the division was even more clear. For example, whereas 85 percent of Democratic committee members were cosponsors of the ADA, only 10 percent of Republican committee members were. In the committees, members tended to split along party lines regarding amendments that most viewed as helping businesses. It is important, however, not to lose sight of the enormous area of agreement on the ADA, which was established in the course of negotiations. Although Republicans and Democrats had their differences, it is a testament to their talents and commitment to a laudable objective that they were largely able to put aside partisanship to find common ground. Lobbying & Grass Roots Activities For business organizations such as NFIB, the Senate deliberations represented a failure. The reason we failed in the Senate, said Wendy Lechner, the NFIB point person for the ADA, was we didn t have time to educate the members. The ADA was pushed through as motherhood and apple pie before we had a chance to do anything. In the House, therefore, the objective was to slow it down long enough for education. NFIB was not alone. Largely under the direction of Nancy Reed Fulco of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, business groups formed the Disability Rights Working Group to help mold the ADA. Different organizations focused on different provisions: NFIB and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce devoted considerable attention to public accommoda tions; the American Bus Association (ABA), the American Public Transit Authority (APTA), and Greyhound examined transportation issues; the National Restaurant Association (NRA), the Cham ber of Commerce, and the National Association of Manufacturers dealt with employment. But they banded together to lobby members of the House about their common concerns. As illustrated in the Senate testimony, business groups were not completely opposed to the bill. We really weren t trying to deep-six it, said Lechner. We were really trying to get a better bill, a more livable bill. We really weren t trying to deep-six it. We were really trying to get a better bill, a more livable bill. Wendy Lechner To create a more livable bill, representatives of covered entities developed a list of about 20 to 30 amendments. Throughout the House deliberations they continually updated this list, removing those changes that were accomplished, and adding others as new issues arose. And they lobbied members of Congress to argue the need for those amendments by issuing various position papers and visiting members offices. In addition to lobbying inside Washing ton, organizations such as NFIB sent out action alerts to their members urging people to write their representatives, especially those serving on committees. Some opponents of the ADA took their concerns about the ADA to the main stream media. Business groups had a number of overriding concerns. One was the vagueness of language contained in the ADA. Business --- * Origin: NFBnet <--> Internet Email Gateway (1:282/1045)