--------------------------------------------------------------------------
 The special vice of a prior restraint on expression is that communication 
will be suppressed, either directly or by inducing excessive caution in the 
speaker, before an adequate determination that is unprotected by the First
Amendment.
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Com. on Human Relations, 413 US 376,
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
93 S Ct 2553, 37 L Ed 2d 669
----------------------------
		    <<<< continued on 3/6 >>>>
___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.12
--- Renegade v10-05 Exp
 * Origin: Camphor Fountain*(510)439-0712*Pittsburg,CA (1:161/19)
---------------

FIDO MESSAGE AREA==> TOPIC: 210 VICTIMS/FALSEACC Ref: CAN00006Date: 06/18/95
From: VALERY FROSTY                                         Time: 03:41am
\/To: ALL                                                 (Read 2 times)
Subj: Civil Suit 3/6

		     <<<< continued from 2/6 >>>>
L. COMPELLING STATE INTEREST REQUIRED, YET NONE STATED.
 Liberty of expression guaranteed by this amendment can be abridged by
state officials if their protections of legitimate state interests 
necessitates an invasion of free speech.
Burnside v. Byars, C.A. Miss. 1966, 363 F 2d 744
------------------------------------------------
 Where the is a significant encroachment upon personal liberty, the state
may prevail only upon showing a subordinating interest which is compelling.
Bates v. Little Rock, 361 US 516, 80 S Ct 412, 4 L Ed 2d 480
------------------------------------------------------------
 The power of a state to abridge freedom of speech is the exception rather
than the rule; and any limitation upon individual liberty must, to avoid
unconstitutionality, have appropriate relation to the safety of the state.
Herndon v. Lowry, 301 US 242, 57 S Ct 732, 81 L.Ed 1066
-------------------------------------------------------
 
M. ORDER FOR MONITORING AND RESULTING CENSORSHIP LACK ELEMENTS OF LAWFUL
REGULATION.
 To restrict pure speech conduct, the state must show that: (1) a clear 
and present danger is presented to society by the speech; (2) the 
individual's interest in allowing the pure speech conduct is insufficient
when balanced against the danger presented to society by allowing the 
conduct; and (3) the government used the narrowest restriction on pure
speech consistent with the governmental interest involved.
Kucinich v. Forbes, D.C. Ohio 1977, 432 F Supp 1101
---------------------------------------------------
 Since only consideration of the greatest urgency can justify restrictions
on speech, and since the validity of a restraint on speech in each case
depends on careful analysis of the particular circumstances, the procedures 
by which the facts of the case are adjudicated are of special importance
and the validity of the restraint may turn on the safeguards which they
afford.
Speise v. Randall, 357 US 513, 78 S Ct 1332, 2 L.Ed 1460
--------------------------------------------------------
N. FACIAL INVALIDITY OF ORDER.
 An injunction which, like a criminal statute, prohibits conduct under fear
of punishment, must be looked at in the same way that a court looks at a
statute, and if upon its face it abridges rights guaranteed by the First
Amendment, it should be stricken down.
United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Michigan, 401 US 576, 91 S Ct 1076,
------------------------------------------------------------------------
28 L.Ed 2d 339
--------------
In reviewing the terms of an injunction, the United States Supreme Court
cannot assume that in its subsequent enforcement, ambiguities will be
resolved in favor of adequate protection of First Amendment rights.
United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Michigan, 401 US 576, 91 S Ct 1076,